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Case No. 20150213-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
CHADLEY KEITH LALVERT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, and threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight 
or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant Chadley Calvert pulled a gun on some passing 
neighborhood children whom he thought had stepped onto his lawn. When 
three parents arrived to speak to Calvert about it, he pulled a gun on the1n 
too, pointing it at one of them. Calvert was convicted of one count of 
aggravated assault for pointing the gun at one parent and of one count of 
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel 
(brandishing) for taking out his gun during a quarrel with multiple people 
present. ~ 
1. Has Calvert overcome the strong presumption that his counsel 
reasonably chose not to seek dismissal of either the aggravated assault or 
brandishing counts before or during trial? 
2. Has Calvert overcome the strong presumption that his 
counsel reasonably chose not to seek merger of the aggravated assault and 
brandishing counts after trial? 
Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance claim raised for the first 
time on appeal presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Bedell, 2014 UT 1, if 20, 322 P.3d 697. 
3. Did the trial court properly admit evidence under rule 404(b) of 
Calvert's prior assault and threat against a neighbor over a trivial matter, 
for the purpose of rebutting his self-defense and fabrication claims? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit evidence under 
rule 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, 
if17, 349 P.3d 712. 
The trial court admitted-without objection-a recording of a 911 call 
made after Calvert pulled out his gun. When the jury retired to deliberate, 
the prosecutor offered to leave a laptop so that the jury could listen to the 
-2-
recording during deliberations if they chose. The laptop contained no case 
files, email, or other outside case information. Defense counsel did not 
object at the time, but later moved to arrest judgment because the jury 
might have been exposed to "outside materials or influences" from the 
prosecutor's laptop, which created "the appearance of impropriety." 
Defense counsel did not then, and has not now, offered any evidence that 
the jury used the laptop at all, let alone to access improper material. 
4. Has Calvert overcome the strong presumption that counsel 
performed objectively reasonably when he raised no objection to the 
jury's having access to the prosecutor's laptop to listen to the 911 
recording? 
Standard of Review. See issues 1 and 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 1 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-402 (statutory merger); 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-103 (aggravated assault); 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 (brandishing). 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the State cites to the current versions of the 
Code. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 2 
One summer evening, a group of about seven neighborhood children 
walked in front of Calvert's house. R283:92-93, 105, 118-19, 123-24, 161-62. 
As they passed, Calvert swore and yelled at them for stepping onto his lawn 
and he threatened to shoot them. Id. at 93, 171. Vv"nen one of the children 
talked back, Calvert pulled out a gun with a laser sight. Id. at 83-84, 243; 
DEl. Some of the children ran to tell their parents. Id. at 136-37, 252-54, 275-
76. 
Two of the children's fathers-Hugo and his brother Adon Holguin-
came immediately to talk to Calvert about what happened. R283:95, 120, 
147, 180, 223, 232, 265-66, 277. They were accompanied by three of the 
children-Ar.H., K.P., and K.H. -and Hugo's wife, Yolanda. Id. at 174, 176, 
225, 255, 260, 277. While Calvert argued with the two men, he pulled out a 
gun with a laser sight and pointed it at or near Adon. Id. at 147, 158, 180, 
197, 202, 235, 245-47. He also pointed it at Hugo's chest "several times." Id. 
at 120, 138, 141, 180, 223, 254, 265-66, 277, 282. This went on for about" eight 
2 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are recited in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 3, 299 P.3d 
892. 
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or nine minutes." Id. at 202. Ar.H. called 911. Id. at 149-50, 186; SE2 (911 
recording). When Ar.H. told Calvert that he was going to call police, 
Calvert went into his garage and "put the gun away." R283:183-84. 
When police arrived, Calvert told them that he had been sitting on his 
steps with a "laser pointer" and that he had it "just pointed at the ground." 
Id. at 303. Calvert said that he had a gun inside the house, but claimed that 
he did not have time to grab it during the quarrel. Id. at 304. He showed 
police a gun without a laser sight. Id. Police asked if he had another gun in 
his garage. Id. at 305-06. Calvert admitted that he did, but claimed that it 
was unloaded. Id. at 307-08. Police found a loaded gun- with a laser 
sight- in the garage. Id. at 308-09; SE 5, 6, 7. The testifying officer did not 
see a laser pointer at the house other than the sight on the loaded gun. 
R208:309. 
Defendant's story. At trial, Calvert admitted, for the first time, to 
pointing his gun at one of the men- he did not know which- but claimed 
to have acted in defense of himself and his property. R284:62, 78. He 
testified that he took "great pride" in his yard and was upset when he saw a 
"bunch of children just causing all sorts of ruckus" there, such as -
according to him-scratching his car with a tree branch and breaking one of 
his sprinklers. Id. at 53-56. Calvert admitted to swearing at the children 
r 
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before they left. Id. at 56-57. Calvert claimed to have then sat down on his 
porch to eat a burrito when someone "scared the hell out of him" by trying 
to grab him through his porch railing. Id. at 56-62, 78. Calvert ran inside his 
house to grab one of his guns. Id. at 56-62. Hearing his garage alarm go off, 
Calvert went to his garage to find a man there. Id. at 58-61. Calvert pointed 
his gun at the man and told him to leave. Id. at 62. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Calvert with aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, and threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel (brandishing), a class A misdemeanor. R1-3. The aggravated 
assault charge was based on Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo Holguin. 
R196 (aggravated assault elements instruction listing Hugo as victim); 
R284:130 (prosecutor closing argument specifying Hugo as victim of 
aggravated assault). The brandishing charge was based on Calvert's 
drawing or exhibiting a gun while in a quarrel in the presence of two or 
more people. See R284:131; Rl 99. 
Over Calvert's objection, the trial court allowed the State to present 
evidence under rule 404(b) and the doch·ine of chances that Calvert had 
previously assaulted and threatened to kill a neighbor during an argument 
over a trivial matter for the purpose of rebutting Calvert's self-defense 
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claim- and by extension, disproving his implicit claim that all of the other 
witnesses were fabricating their version of events. R93-108 (State's motion 
in limine to admit 404(b) evidence); R283:28-30 (trial court ruling admitting 
404(b) evidence to rebut "fabrication as well as self-defense"). 
The trial court also admitted-without objection-a recording of the 
911 call. SE2; R283:150. Before deliberations, the prosecutor offered to let 
the jury use a laptop from his office to listen to the 911 call during 
deliberations; Calvert did not object. R284:147. 
The jury convicted Calvert as charged. R166-67. Before sentencing, 
defense counsel moved to arrest judgment, asserting that letting the jury 
take the laptop into deliberations was error. R209-11. He proffered no 
evidence that the jurors had even used the computer or that they had 
accessed anything improper. Id. He instead argued that the possibility of 
access to outside information-whether from files on the computer or the 
internet-imputed an "appearance of impropriety" that was "impossible to 
overcome." R211. The prosecutor explained that his office used the laptop 
only at jury trials as a tool, that it did not have any case information on it, 
and he did not know whether it was even internet-capable at the 
courthouse. R226-27; R282:17-19. He also noted that Calvert had not shown 
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that the jury viewed anything improper on the laptop. R226-27. The trial 
court denied the motion to arrest judgment. R282:21. 
The court then sentenced Calvert to suspended statutory prison and 
jail terms, and placed him on probation with conditions including 90 days 
in jail, 50 hours of community service, a mental health evaluation, and any 
recommended treatment. Id. at 25-26. Calvert timely appealed. R273-75, 
276-77. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: Calvert first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
not moving either before or during trial to (1) dismiss either the aggravated 
assault or the brandishing charge; or (2) make the brandishing charge a 
lesser-included offense of the assault charge. Calvert's arguments rest on a 
faulty premise- that he was charged for a single act. The evidence shows 
separate acts for each charge. It was obvious from the jury instructions and 
counsel's arguments that the aggravated assault charge related only to 
Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo. That left the independent act of 
exhibiting a weapon in a fight or quarrel in front of two or more people. 
Defense counsel could have reasonably decided not to move for dismissal of 
one court or inclusion of a lesser offense because had he done so, the 
prosecutor would have simply emphasized that the evidence supported not 
-8-
only the two charged counts, but additional assault and brandishing counts 
as well. Any motion to dismiss one of the counts or to make brandishing a 
lesser-included offense would have surely failed. 
Issue II: Calvert alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective 
for not moving to merge the two counts after conviction. He argues both for 
Finlayson merger and statutory merger. Because this case does not involve 
any kidnapping or unlawful detention offense, Finlayson merger does not 
apply. Statutory merger does not apply for essentially the same reasons 
that counsel did not perform deficiently in not moving to dismiss one count: 
separate conduct supported separate charges. Because there was no valid 
basis for merger, counsel could not have been ineffective for not seeking it. 
Issue III: Calvert next argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
under rule 404(b) and the doctrine of chances by admitting evidence that he 
had previously assaulted and threatened a neighbor over a trivial matter for 
the purpose of rebutting his fabrication and self-defense claims. He argues 
that the h·ial court admitted the evidence for the improper purpose of 
showing his bad character under rule 404(a); that it was not relevant 
because it was unrelated to this case and factually dissimilar; that rebutting 
fabrication is not a proper purpose where the defendant admits that an 
altercation took place; that rebutting self-defense is not a proper purpose 
-9-
under these facts; that a single prior instance cannot show relevance under 
the doctrine of chances; that its probative value was substantially 
outweighed by its danger for unfair prejudice because it only served to 
show his bad character; and that the trial court did not scrupulously 
examine the prior assault evidence. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the prior 
fight evidence. The prior assault was relevant to the proper, noncharacter 
purposes of rebutting Calvert's self-defense and fabrication claims. A single 
prior instance may be relevant under the doctrine of chances due to the low 
baseline likelihood of being falsely accused by one's neighbors of assaulting 
and threatening them over trivial matters. 
And the evidence's probative value was not substantially outweighed 
by the danger for unfair prejudice under rule 403 where the other conduct 
was both similar to and less serious than the charged conduct. The record 
also shows that the trial court scrupulously examined the evidence. 
But even if the evidence were improperly admitted, any error was 
harmless where Calvert's story was incredible, the evidence of his guilt was 
overwhelming, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, and the prosecutor 
did not mention the other conduct in opening state1nent, closing argument, 
or at any other time. 
-10-
/~ 
Issue IV: Calvert finally argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for not objecting when the prosecutor offered a laptop for the jury to use 
should they desire to listen to the 911 call recording during deliberations. 
Calvert argues that this Court should presume that the very presence of the 
laptop- even without evidence of improper use-violated his rights to 
counsel and jury trial. But a defendant like Calvert claiming ineffective 
assistance must show both deficient performance and prejudice. He can 
show neither because the problem that he posits- that the jury might have 
accessed information outside the evidence - is based on pure speculation. 




Because the aggravated assault and brandishing counts were 
based on different conduct, Calvert cannot overcome 
Strickland's strong presumption that counsel performed 
effectively by not seeking dismissal of the brandishing count. 
Calvert asserts that the brandishing count is a lesser-included offense 
of the aggravated assault count. Aplt.Br. 15-21. He argues that his trial 
counsel was thus ineffective either for (1) not moving to dismiss the lesser 
count at the end of the State's case, or (2) not seeking jury instructions that 
would have treated the brandishing count as a lesser-included offense of 
-11-
aggravated assault. Id. at 21-22. Calvert asserts that counsel's alleged 
failure subjected him "to a conviction twice for essentially the same 
conduct." Id. at 22. 
Calvert can prove neither deficient performance nor prejudice 
because it was clear from the evidence before the jury that the two charges 
were based on different conduct. Failure to bring motions unsupported by 
the facts or law is never unreasonable, nor can it be prejudicial. 
A. To prevail, Calvert must prove that no reasonable attorney 
would have forgone a motion to dismiss or for a lesser-
included-off ense instruction. 
Ineffective assistance requires proof of both (1) deficient performance 
and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
Establishing deficient performance requires the defendant to prove that no 
reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did. Id. at 687-88; State 
v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, il 6 (defendant must "persuad[e] the court that there 
was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions.") (citation and 
quotation omitted). 
To "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight," reasonableness is 
evaluated from "counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. It is also viewed under "prevailing professional norms," rather than 
"best practices" or "common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 
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778 (2011 ). Review of counsel's performance is highly deferential because, 
unlike the reviewing court, counsel "observed the relevant proceedings, 
knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with 
opposing counsel, and with the judge." Id. at 788. Thus, there are "countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case" - even "the best 
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same 
way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
Establishing prejudice requires the defendant to show that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A 
reasonable probability is one "sufficient to undennine confidence in the 
outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Proof of prejudice must be based on a "demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations 
and quotation omitted). 
A defendant can prove neither deficient performance nor prejudice if 
the motion he argues counsel should have filed would have surely failed. 
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Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, if 222, 344 P.3d 581 (holding no ineffective 
assistance for not challenging jury instruction on appeal where challenge 
would have "surely failed" and "[i]t follows that it would have hardly been 
obvious to appellate counsel to challenge the instruction"). 
B. Counsel reasonably forwent a motion to dismiss or to treat 
the brandishing count as a lesser-included offense because it 
was clear that the two charges were based on separate 
conduct. 
Calvert's argument that counsel should have moved to dismiss the 
brandishing count-or at least sought to have it treated as a lesser-included 
offense of aggravated assault- rests entirely on his assumption that the 
brandishing count is in fact necessarily included in the aggravated assault 
count. It is not. The evidence, argument, and jury instructions make clear 
that the aggravated assault and threatening counts were based on 
completely different acts: the aggravated assault count was based on 
Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo; the brandishing count was based on his 
exhibiting the gun during a quarrel in the presence of two or more 
persons-that is, either when he threatened the seven children with the gun, 
or the adults and children who later confronted him. 
A defendant cannot be convicted of both a greater and a necessarily 
included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). An offense is statutorily 
included under only three circumstances: (1) if it "is established by proof of 
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the same or less than all the facts required to establish" the greater charge; 
(2) it" constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation 
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included"; or (3) it "is 
specifically designated by statute as a lesser included offense." Id. Only the 
first circumstance is at issue here. 
This test focuses purely on the language of the statutes at issue, and is 
the same as the "necessarily included" standard applicable when the 
prosecution requests a lesser-included-offense instruction at trial: the 
elements of the lesser offense must be "necessarily included within the 
statutory elements of the" greater offense. State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, 
,r,13-18, 993 P.2d 869; see also State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155-57 (Utah 1983). 
In other words, "[t]he offenses must be such that the greater cannot 
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser." Carruth, 
1999 UT 107, if 6 (quoting Baker, 67 P.2d at 155-56). This means that as long 
as the lesser offense does not contain any element not found in the greater 
charged offense, the lesser offense is necessarily included. Id. at ,I17. It also 
means that if the two charges are based on separate conduct, one cannot be 
necessarily included in the other. Cf State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97-98 (Utah 
1983) (merging aggravated robbery and theft where "the only evidence 
before the jury" showed a theft occurring as part of the robbery). 
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Here, brandishing is not necessarily included in aggravated assault 
because it has an additional element that aggravated assault does not. 
Brandishing is also not necessarily included in aggravated assault here 
because it was based on separate conduct. 
To prove aggravated assault, the State needed to show that Calvert (1) 
threatened another; (2) "accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another"; and (3) used a "dangerous 
weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. 
Aggravated assault thus criminalizes each time a person threatens 
another with a show of immediate force using a dangerous weapon-
relevant here, each thne he points a gun at "another." See, e.g., State v. 
Syvongsa, 2012 UT App 277, ~6, 288 P.3d 43 (holding evidence sufficient for 
aggravated assault where "Defendant pointed a gun directly at" the victim 
while "yelling s01nething"); see also Harris v. State, 35 S.W.3d 819, 823-24 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (pointing gun suffices for aggravated assault); People v. 
Raviart, 93 Cal. App. 4th 258, 263 (2001) (similar); Watson v. State, 689 S.E.2d 
104, 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (similar); State v. Julien, 34 So.3d 494, 499 (La. 
Ct. App. 2010) (similar); Sosa v. State, 177 S.W.3d 227, 231-32 (Texas Ct. App. 
2005) (similar); cf State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995) ("the only 
possible inference to be made when someone holds a loaded gun to the 
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head of another and issues an order is that failure to comply will result in 
use of the gun."). 
To prove brandishing, the State needed to prove that Calvert (1) "in 
the presence of two or more persons"; (2) drew or exhibited a dangerous 
weapon; (3) 11 in an angry and threatening manner"; during (4) 11 a fight or 
quarrel." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506. Brandishing thus criminalizes each 
time a person angrily and threateningly draws or exhibits a dangerous 
weapon during a fight when two or more people are present. See, e.g., State 
v. Phelps, 2005 UT App 451 U, *1 (holding evidence sufficient for brandishing 
where evidence established that defendant "exhibited his gun to" the 
victim); see also State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, ,I,I2-3, 19-20, 15 P.3d 635 
(holding evidence sufficient where defendant brandished a 1115 to 18 inch 
club" during angry confrontation with two women). 
Because brandishing requires an additional element that assault does 
not-the presence of two or more persons-it is not a statutorily lesser-
included offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (defining lesser-
included offense as requiring proof of the "same or less" than the facts of 
the greater crime, constituting an attempt, solicitation, etc. of greater 
offense, or designated by statute as lesser offense); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 
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874, 878 (Utah 1985) (holding offense lesser-included where "the jury was 
not required to find any additional elements to convict"). 
It is true, as Calvert points out, Aplt.Br. at 17-18, that a broader 
standard applies when a defendant seeks a lesser-included offense at trial. 
Under that "evidence-based standard" -which does not require that the 
lesser offense be necessarily included in the greater offense-a defendant is 
entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when some of the elements 
of the offenses merely "overlap" and the evidence provides a rational basis 
for acquitting on the greater charge and convicting of the lesser. Baker, 671 
P.2d at 154-59. 
Thus, regardless of whether Calvert might have been able to get a 
brandishing lesser offense instruction on the aggravated assault charge if he 
had sought one, see State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1984) (holding 
that brandishing and aggravated assault have "overlapping elements" of 
requiring threats and use of weapon), he would not have been entitled to a 
dismissal of the brandishing charge because it was not necessarily included 
in the aggravated assault charge. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 (requiring 
brandishing to be conunitted in the "presence of two or more persons"). 
Calvert also would not have been entitled to dismissal of the 
brandishing charge because it and the assault charged were based on 
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separate acts. "[A]cts are separate" -and thus separately chargeable- "if 
they are not necessary to each other or are sufficiently separated by time 
and space." State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ,I21, 71 P.3d 624 (citations 
omitted); see also State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, 'if 8, 37 P.3d 1099 (upholding 
separate convictions where clear from verdict that convictions based on 
separate evidence). 
The evidence at trial supported two brandishings. A.C. testified that 
as the group of children initially passed Calvert's house, Calvert became 
upset, "pulled out a gun," and threatened to "to shoot" them.3 R283:93-94, 
105. And Adon testified that Calvert threatened him while pointing a gun 
at the ground between them. R282:235, 246. As many as two other adults 
and three children would have been present at the time. R283:174, 176, 225, 
255, 260, 277. 
Calvert's brandishing a gun while yelling obscenities at seven 
children-or while later arguing with the three adults-was "not necessary" 
to Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, if 21. And 
3 Though her trial testimony differed on this point, K.P.' s police 
statement at the time of these events corroborated that Calvert pulled out a 
red laser-which she thought might have been a flashlight-during his 
argument with the children. Id. at 212-14. And the officer stated that he 
saw no separate laser pointer either inside or outside Calvert's home. 
R283:309. 
-19-
there was at least one clear break in time between offenses when the 
children left to tell the adults and the three adults and three children 
returned. Id. Further, it was clear to the jury that the aggravated assault 
was based on Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo. R196; R294:130. And no 
one argued at trial that pointing the gun at Hugo was also the basis for the 
brandishing charge. R283: 87-88 (State opening); R284:13-15 (defense 
opening); R284:129-36, 142-44 (State closing and rebuttal); R284:136-41 
( defense closing). 
Given the evidence of separate acts for each charge, counsel could 
reasonably decide not to move to dismiss one or the other charge or to make 
the brandishing a necessarily lesser-included offense of the aggravated 
assault. Because there were separate bases, any such motion would have 
surely failed. See State v. Johnson, 2015 UT App 312, ,I16, 803 Utah Adv. Rep. 
33 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where defense motion would have 
been futile). If defense counsel had done so, the prosecutor would have 
merely emphasized the separate nature of the charges. It could have also 
prompted the prosecutor to emphasize that the evidence supported two 
potential brandishings - one against the children, and one against the 
adults-as well as four aggravated assaults for Calvert pointing his gun at 
Hugo, Adon, Ar.H., and A.C. R283:107-09 (A.C. testifying that Calvert 
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pointed gun at A.C. and Ar.H.); id. at 180 (Ar.H. testifying that Calvert 
pointed gun at Adon and Hugo); id.at 202 (K.P. testifying that Calvert 
pointed gun at Adon and Hugo); id. at 254, 265-66, 277 (two adults testifying 
that Calvert pointed gun at Hugo). 
Calvert cursorily adds that counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
dismiss one or the other counts as multiplicitous. Aplt.Br. 19-21. This 
assertion fails for two reasons. First, because the State filed two charges 
under two different code sections, they could not have been multiplicitous. 
Multiplicity forbids the State from charging a single offense as multiple 
offenses- that is, from charging multiple counts of the same offense. See 
State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ,I,125-27, 356 P.3d 1258 (holding that defendant 
was subject to twelve counts of discharge of a firearm for a drive-by 
shooting in which he shot twelve times); State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177, 
if 133-35, 317 P.3d 433 (holding that defendant was subject to multiple 
counts of sexual offenses because the legislature criminalized each act, not 
each course of conduct). As explained, that did not happen here. 
Second, even if the multiplicity doch·ine could apply to different code 
sections, that would not aid Calvert. Whether a charge is multiplicitous 
depends upon the "unit of prosecution" -what the legislature criminalized. 
Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, if if 8-9. As explained, aggravated assault criminalizes 
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each pointing of the gun at a person, and brandishing criminalizes each 
display of a weapon during a fight in the presence of two or more persons. 
The evidence supported multiple counts of both brandishing and 
aggravated assault, but the State only charged one of each. R283:93-94 (A.C. 
testifying that Calvert "pulled out a gun" during argument with children); 
R283:107 (A.C. testifying that Clavert pointed gun at Ar.H.); R283:120, 158, 
254, 265-66, 277 (multiple witnesses testifying that Calvert pointed gun at 
Hugo); R283:180, 197, 202 (Ar.H. and K.P. testifying that Calvert pointed 
gun at both Hugo and Adon); R283:235, 247-47 (Adon testifying that Calvert 
pointed gun at ground in front of him); cf State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 
,r,32-33, 314 P.3d 1014 (holding that aggravated burglary, aggravated 
kidnapping, and aggravated assault did not merge where the State 
presented "evidence to support multiple variants of each crime"). Thus, 
counsel could have reasonably decided to forgo a multiplicity challenge. 
In this light, counsel also could have reasonably decided not to 
request-as Calvert argues he was required to, Aplt.Br. 21-that the trial 
court require the State to elect which charge it desired to proceed on. And 
for the same reasons, counsel could have reasonably decided not to request 
that the brandishing charge be made a lesser-included offense. Cf State v. 
Smith, 2003 UT App 52, ~,I29-30, 65 P.3d 648 (holding no plain error for not 
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giving lesser-included instruction on brandishing in aggravated assault case 
where defendant claimed "total innocence"), overruled in part on other 
grounds by 2005 UT 57, 122 P.3d 615. 
For similar reasons, counsel could have reasonably decided not to 
move for a directed verdict before jury deliberations. Aplt.Br. 21. A 
directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and is 
granted only when, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, no reasonable juror could have convicted. State v. 
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ~177, 299 P.3d 892. And it is the province of the jury-
not the appellate court- to determine witness credibility. State v. Riker, 2015 
UT App 293, ,I2, 801 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. A reasonable juror could have 
believed the testimony of the State's witnesses over Calvert's self-serving, 
inconsistent tale- and could have relied on at least two separate acts for the 
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brandishing count. Thus, a directed verdict motion would have "surely 
failed." 4 Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ,f 222. 
C. Because the counts were based on separate conduct, Calvert 
also cannot prove prejudice. 
Calvert also cannot prove prejudice- that is, a reasonable likelihood 
of a different result absent the alleged error-for essentially the same 
reasons that he cannot show deficient performance. The charges were 
based on separate conduct. Because a motion to dis1niss or consolidate the 
counts based on separate would have surely failed, making the motion 
would not have made a difference. Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ,f 222. 
4 Regarding the lesser-included offense, Calvert has not overcome 
Strickland's strong presumption of effective representation for a second 
reason: counsel could have reasonably decided not to seek a lesser-included 
of brandishing because it was not material to his chosen strategy. Counsel's 
chosen strategy here was to seek full acquittal by relying on Calvert's 
testimony. R284:13-15 (defense opening statement), 136-41 (defense closing 
statement). Such an "all or nothing" defense, "though risky, is a reasonable 
trial strategy." State v. Carson, 357 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Wash. 2015); see also 
Mccrady v. State, 461 S.W.3d 443, 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (citing cases). 
This is particularly true where, as here, that sh·ategy is based on the 
defendant's statements. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (holding that 
reasonableness of counsel's decisions "depends critically" on "information 
supplied by the defendant"); Davis v. State, 653 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007) (holding '" all-or-nothing' defense" reasonable where defendant 
claimed self-defense). It does not matter that other strategies may have 
been equally reasonable or even more reasonable. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 
15, if ~41, 43, 328 P.3d 841; Carson, 357 P.3d at 1071-72. 
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II. 
Because the aggravated assault and brandishing convictions 
were based on different conduct, Calvert cannot overcome 
Strickland's strong presumption that counsel performed 
effectively by not seeking to merge the two at sentencing. 
Calvert alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 
moving to merge the two convictions at sentencing. Aplt.Br. 23-27. Though 
he conflates them into a single test, he actually raises two distinct merger 
arguments: (1) Finlayson merger and (2) statutory merger. 
Calvert again cannot prove deficient performance because Finlayson 
merger applies only when one of the convictions involves kidnapping or an 
unlawful detention, and, as explained, there can be no statutory merger 
because the two convictions were based on separate conduct. 
A. The two convictions do not merge under Finlayson because 
neither offense involved a detention. 
Finlayson merger applies only to cases involving both a kidnapping or 
unlawful detention and a host offense in which some detention is inherent. 
See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ,r,r17-19, 994 P.2d 1243 (citing State v. 
Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981)). Because there was no kidnapping offense 
here, Finlayson is inapposite. Counsel could thus have reasonably decided 
not to seek merger on this basis. 
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B. The two convictions do not merge statutorily because they 
were based on separate conduct. 
As explained in Point I, statutory merger applies when a defendant is 
convicted of both an offense and a lesser offense II established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of 
the" greater offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Where, as here, the 
greater offense has multiple variants, the court must II consider the evidence 
to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the 
specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial." Hill, 674 P.2d at 
97. 
As explained, the variant of aggravated assault at trial was a (1) threat 
accompanied by (2) an immediate show of force using (3) a dangerous 
weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Brandishing was not fully subsumed 
into aggravated assault because it required two elements nowhere in 
aggravated assault: (1) a "fight or quarrel," and (2) the presence of "two or 
more persons." Id.§ 76-10-506. These additional elements preclude merger. 
State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 133, 128 P.3d 1179 (holding no statutory merger 
where alleged included offense required additional element); State v. Ross, 
951 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah App. 1997) (explaining that statutory merger 
inapplicable if jury required to find additional element for lesser offense). 
And as stated, the convictions also had separate factual bases. Cf State v. 
-26-
iiJI 
Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, if if30-35, 314 P.3d 1014 (holding no merger of 
offenses where the "jury had before it evidence to support multiple variants 
of each crime"). Thus, counsel could reasonably choose not to seek 
statutory merger. 
In sum, Calvert has proven neither deficient performance nor 
prejudice any motion to merge would have surely failed. 
III. 
The trial court properly admitted evidence under rule 404(b) 
that Calvert previously assaulted and threatened a neighbor 
over a triviality for the purpose of rebutting self-defense and 
fabrication. 
The trial court admitted evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and the doctrine of chances that Calvert had previously assaulted 
a neighbor and threatened to kill her during an argument over a trivial 
matter. The trial court admitted the evidence for the purpose of rebutting 
Calvert's self-defense claim and his implicit charge that the other witnesses 
were fabricating their stories. R283:30. Trial courts have broad discretion to 
admit such evidence, and their decisions are overturned only if they are 
"beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, if 12, 802 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (citation and quotation omitted). 
Calvert argues that the trial court abused its discretion because: (1) 
disproving fabrication was not a proper purpose under rule 404(b) where he 
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did not deny that the incident took place, only that it took place differently 
than the State's witnesses testified; (2) the evidence was not relevant under 
rule 402; (3) the trial court erroneously relied on the doctrine of chances 
because a single prior incident cannot show intent under that doctrine; (4) 
the h·ial court did not scrupulously examine the evidence before admitting 
it; and (5) the trial court improperly weighed the danger for unfair prejudice 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt.Br. 29-40. 
The trial court was well within its discretion to admit the pnor 
assault. But even if it were not, any error was clearly harmless where the 
evidence of Calvert's guilt was overwhelming, his own testimony was 
incredible, the other act testimony was brief, the court gave a limiting 
instruction, and the prosecutor did not mention the other act in opening 
statement or closing argument. 
A. The trial court admitted the brief testimony and instructed 
the jury to consider it, if at all, solely to determine Calvert's 
self-defense and fabrication claims. 
Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of two prior assaults 
and threats that Calvert had made against neighbors: (1) a 2008 incident in 
Holladay in which Calvert swore at and threatened to kill Camille Little 
after she confronted him for taking pictures of her house; and (2) a 1999 
incident in West Valley in which Calvert drove his car sh·aight at Pat Wall's 
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car, swerved at the last moment, and then profanely threatened that he 
would kill Wall. R93-108. The State sought to use both incidents to rebut 
any claims of fabrication and self-defense, and argued that they met the four 
foundational requirements under the doctrine of chances set forth in State v. 
Verde, 2012 UT 60, 296 P.3d 673. Id. Both the State and Calvert fully briefed 
the issue under rules 404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Id.; R115-27. 
Calvert responded that (1) the real purpose of the proposed evidence 
was to show a "propensity to commit crime"; (2) that rebutting fabrication 
was not a proper purpose because fabrication required a claim that the 
victims concocted the whole altercation, whereas Calvert had agreed that 
the altercation occurred, but merely disagreed about what happened during 
it; (3) that rebutting self-defense was not a proper purpose because the State 
was not seeking to explain the victims' actions. Rl 15-20. He also argued 
that the doctrine of chances was inapplicable because, among other things, 
multiple occurrences were required, the events were dissimilar, and the 
charges in the prior cases had been dismissed. R120-125. He also argued 
that both incidents were unfairly prejudicial because they went only to 
propensity. R124-26. 
The trial court heard argument on the motion before trial, which 
included a discussion of relevant case law and the danger of unfair 
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prejudice. R283:6-30. The trial court excluded the older West Valley 
incident as "a little bit far afield," but admitted the more recent Holladay 
incident under the four foundational requirements for the doctrine of 
chances set out in Verde and argued by the prosecutor. Id. at 30. The trial 
court found that the evidence was: (1) material to disprove self-defense and 
fabrication, which was in genuine dispute; (2) roughly similar to the 
charged offense in that Calvert had argued with and threatened to kill his 
neighbors both times; (3) the accusations were independent of each other, 
made by different neighbors in three different cities; and (4) that the 
threshold frequency of being falsely accused of threatening to kill one's 
neighbors was low. R283:28-29; see also R98-105. The court further ruled 
that the danger for unfair prejudice was not "substantially outweighed by 
the prejudicial effect" under rule 403. R283:30. 
Before Ms. Little testified about the Holladay incident, the trial court 
introduced her to the jury as a "special reasons witness," and stated that he 
would instruct them later regarding the purpose of her testimony. 
R283:288. Ms. Little testified that Calvert had sworn at her, pushed her 
down, and threatened to kill her when she confronted him about taking 
pictures of her house. R283:291-94. She did not know any of the victims in 
this case. Id. at 289. 
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The prosecutor did not reference Ms. Little's testimony in any other 
testimony or during opening statement or closing argument. R283:87-88; 
R284:129-36, 142-44. The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider 
her testimony "if at all, for the limited purposes of: considering defendant's 
fabrication and self-defense claim[s] in the current case," and that it could 
not consider the evidence II to prove a character trait of the defendant nor to 
show that the defendant has a propensity to act in a certain way." R200. 
The jury was further instructed that "defendant [was] on trial for the crime 
charged in this case, and for that crime only. You may not convict the 
defendant simply because you believe that he may have committed some 
other act at some other time." Id. 
B. Rule 404(b) permits other acts evidence to disprove self-
defense and rebut a charge of fabrication. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states that other acts evidence is 
not admissible to prove a person's character II in order to show action in 
conformity therewith," but may be "admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b); see State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, if 59, 27 P.3d 1115; State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,I31, 256 
P.3d 1102; State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, '1f23, 198 P.3d 471; State v. Lee, 
831 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah App. 1992). Though 404(b) evidence is often called 
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"prior bad acts" evidence, the evidence need neither be prior to the charged 
act nor necessarily bad. See Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. 
Kirckpatrick, Federal Evidence (3d ed. 2007) § 4:28 at 747, 749. The rule 
embraces a wide swath of other acts. Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary rule." 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, if 24, 993 P.2d 837. Evidence is presumptively 
admissible so long as it is relevant to a proper, noncharacter purpose. Id. 
Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence," and is II of 
consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. To be II of 
consequence," the evidence must go to a contested issue at trial. Verde, 2012 
UT 60, ,rif24-26. Relevance is a "very low," binary standard- evidence with 
even the "slightest probative value" is relevant and presumptively 
admissible. State v. Richardson, 2013 UT 50, if if 24-29, 308 P.3d 526; Utah R. 
Evid. 402 (relevant evidence presumptively admissible). 
Proper, noncharacter purposes include- but are not limited to - those 
listed in the rule. State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, i128, 62 P.3d 444 ("While 
rule 404(b) lists examples of some of the legitimate purposes for which other 
bad acts evidence may be admitted, the list is not exhaustive."). They 
include rebutting a charge of fabrication and disproving a self-defense 
claim. Verde, 2012 UT 60, if47 (rebutting fabrication claim is proper 
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noncharacter purpose); State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ,123, 318 P.3d 1151 
(rebutting self-defense claim is proper noncharacter purpose). 
A purpose is "proper" if it shows something other than only a bad 
character or propensity. But even if the evidence tends to also show a bad 
character trait or propensity-as is often the case-that alone does not 
render it inadmissible. Rather, it "is only excluded where the sole reason it 
is being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted in 
conformity with that character." State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah 
App. 1994) (citations and additional quotation marks omitted)5; accord Verde, 
2012 UT 60, if24; 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Federal Evidence§ 404.20 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 
1997) (updated 2010) ("Rule 404(b) adopts an inclusionary approach, 
generally providing for the admission of all evidence of other acts that is 
relevant to an issue in trial, excepting only evidence offered to prove 
criminal propensity"). 6 
5 State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) abrogated Olsen, but itself 
was abrogated by a rule change as recognized in Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ,I23, 
which reaffirmed the rule's inclusionary character. 
6 Utah courts consider sources interpreting a similar or identical 
federal rule as persuasive authority of the meaning of Utah's rule. See, e.g., 
Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, if 25, 216 P.3d 944. 
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Relevant evidence offered for a proper purpose may be excluded 
only if the danger for unfair prejudice from the evidence "substantially 
outweighs" the evidence's probative value. Utah R. Evid. 403; Decorso, 1999 
UT 57, ,r20. The "exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an 
extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly." Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 
F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation omitted); see also 
United States v. Glover, 846 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "if 
judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a 
trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal"). 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it creates" an undue tendency 
to suggest decision on an improper basis." State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 
(Utah 1989). "The critical question is whether certain testimony is so 
prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence." State v. 
Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ,I27, 133 P.3d 363. This Court "presume[s] that the 
proffered evidence is admissible unless '[it] has an unusual propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury."' State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 
,I18, 973 P.2d 404 (citation omitted). A remote-or even equal-chance of a 
decision on an improper basis does not render the evidence inadmissible; 
rather, the danger for unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the 
evidence's probative value. See Decorso, 1999 UT 57, if 20; Utah R. Evid. 403. 
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In evaluating the potential for unfair prejudice from a given piece of 
evidence, Utah courts in the past have resorted to the "Shickles factors," 
which include the strength of the evidence, similarity of crimes, time 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the availability and efficacy 
of alternative proof, and the chance that the evidence will "rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). 
But the Utah Supreme Court has recently made clear that it is the language 
of rule 403-not the Shickles factors-that governs. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, if2 
("Thus, the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence 
satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing more and nothing 
less."); Lucero, 2014 UT 15,132,328 P.3d 841 (holding that courts" are bound 
by the text of rule 403, not the limited list of considerations outlined in 
Shickles."). And the court specifically disavowed this language in Cuttler. 
2015 UT 95, ,I20 ("[W]e now make clear that it is inappropriate for a court to 
consider the overmastering hostility factor in a rule 403 analysis."). Of 
course, some Shickles factors may be helpful in a given case. Id. at ifi118-19. 7 
As stated, the trial court here relied on the doctrine of chances to 
admit the evidence. This doctrine is a "theory of logical relevance that rests 
on the objective improbability of the same rare misfortune befalling one 
7 Cuttler issued after Calvert filed his opening brief. 
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individual over and over." Verde, 2012 UT 60, if 47 (citation and quotation 
omitted). That is, the more often something similar happens to the sa1ne 
person, the less likely it is due to accident, chance, justification, third party 
action, or the like. See Verde, 2012 UT 60, ilif 47-52 (discussing doctrine of 
chances in context of 404(b) evidence); see also United States v. York, 933 F.2d 
1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that if you win the lottery once, you 
get congratulated; if you win twice, you get investigated); overruled on other 
grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999). 
The paradigmatic example of the doctrine of chances is the "brides in 
the bath" case of Rex v. Smith, 11 Crim.App. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915) 
(cited in Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I49 n.20). The common axiom for which Smith 
is cited is that the more one's wives die in bathtub drownings, the less each 
drowning looks like an accident. See, e.g., Verde, 2012 UT 60, if 49. But the 
doctrine of chances is not limited to disproving mistake or accident; it may 
also help to establish other proper purposes. For example, in Smith, similar 
bride drownings did not just show a lack of accident; they also helped 
establish the killer's identity (the husband); 1nodus operandi ( death by 
bathtub drowning); plan or motive (marrying women for their money and 
killing them to get it); and intent ( desire to kill). All of these proper 
purposes under rule 404(b) were supported by the doctrine of chances 
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because each occurrence decreased the likelihood not only that they 
occurred by accident, but also that someone else did it, that other persons 
happened to choose a similar mode of killing, or that the murderer had the 
requisite intent. See United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134-35 (4th Cir. 
1973). 
If evidence is relevant under the doctrine of chances, the State must 
show four foundational requirements under rule 403: (1) materiality: that 
the "issue for which the uncharged conduct is offered" is in "bona fide 
dispute"; (2) similarity: that the other incident(s) have a "rough[]" similarity 
to the charged crime; (3) independence: that each accusation is 
"independent of the others"; and (4) frequency: that the defendant was 
"accused of the crime ... more frequently that the typical person" is. Verde, 
2012 UT 60, ,Iif 57-61 (citations and quotations omitted). 
C. The trial court acted well within its discretion to admit 
Calvert's prior assault and threat. 
Based on the foregoing standards, the trial court was well within its 
discretion to admit the prior assault evidence. 
As shown, disproving fabrication and self-defense are proper, non-
character purposes. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I47 (rebutting fabrication clahn is 
proper noncharacter purpose); Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ,I23 (rebutting self-
defense is proper noncharacter purpose). Ms. Little's testimony was 
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relevant to show these purposes. It is not often that one is falsely accused 
by one's neighbors of assaults and threats over trivial matters. And the fact 
that such a rare occurrence allegedly befell Calvert twice made it more 
likely that the neighbors were not fabricating their accounts (and that he 
was). Calvert's prior assaulting and threats to Ms. Little over a triviality 
were relevant to disprove self-defense and fabrication because they made it 
less likely that the neighbors here were fabricating a charge that Calvert 
assaulted and threatened them over a triviality. By making fabrication less 
likely, the evidence concomitantly made Calvert's self-defense claim less 
likely. And its potential for unfair prejudice could not substantially 
outweigh its probative value where the allegation there was less serious 
than the charges here because it did not involve a gun. See Lucero, 2014 UT 
15, ,I35 (holding under rule 403 that evidence of prior abuse was not 
unfairly prejudicial because it was "tame in comparison to" the evidence of 
charged conduct). 
The evidence also met the requirements for the doctrine of chances. 
The evidence was (1) material because self-defense and fabrication were in 
"bona fide dispute" where Calvert's story was completely different from all 
other witnesses; (2) "roughly similar" in that both incidents involved 
Calvert flying off the handle at some trivial matter and assaulting and 
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threatening his neighbor(s); (3) independent where the victim in the prior 
cases did not know any of the victims here; and ( 4) the threshold level of 
being falsely accused of assaulting and threatening one's neighbors is low. 
Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,f if 57-61. 
Citing Verde, Calvert argues that the trial court improperly relied on 
disproving fabrication as a proper purpose because Calvert did not 
completely deny the incident, only how the events unfolded. Aplt.Br. 29. 
Verde, who was accused of sexual abuse of a child, denied that any sexual 
contact took place. 2012 UT 60, ,I9. The supreme court held that evidence 
that Verde had prior sexual contact with young adult men was not relevant 
to prove intent because intent was not in bona fide dispute, and was thus 
not relevant. Id. at ,f 57. But the supreme court also held that the evidence 
could be relevant to disprove fabrication if the State sought to admit it for 
that purpose, and remanded for the trial court to evaluate that claim in the 
first instance. Id. at ,I,I20, 47, 56. 
Calvert reasons that because Verde denied that the alleged incident 
(sexual abuse) between himself and the victim ever took place, rebutting 
fabrication is in bona fide dispute only where a defendant denies that the 
incident forming the basis for the charges ever took place. Aplt.Br. 29. 
Because Calvert did not deny that he had a confrontation with his 
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neighbors, but he only disagreed with what happened, Calvert asserts that 
rebutting fabrication was not in bona fide dispute here. Id. 
But Verde does not limit rule 404(b) evidence to rebut total- as 
opposed to partial-fabrication. Indeed, Verde itself relied on a rape case-
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59-where the defendant did not deny having 
sex, but rather claimed that she had consented to sexual acts other than 
those alleged. Verde, 2012 UT 60, if 53; Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ,r12. 
Thus, admitting 404(b) evidence to rebut a charge of partial fabrication is 
just as proper to rebut a charge of total fabrication. 
Calvert similarly asserts that rebutting self-defense was not a proper 
purpose because his case differs from Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, if23, where 
this court held that rebutting self-defense was a proper purpose. Labrum 
was charged with assaulting his wife. Id. at ir2. During the altercation, his 
wife was holding a set of keys, which Labrum landed on during the assault. 
Id. at if3. Labrum claimed self-defense, testifying that his wife used the 
keys to attack him. Id. at ,I4. This court held that the State properly 
introduced 404(b) evidence of prior abuse to show that the wife took the 
keys to bed to defend herself against Labrum and to rebut Labrum's self-
defense claim. Id. at ,I23. Calvert acknowledges Labrum, but baldly asserts 
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that rebutting self-defense is not a proper purpose here because Labrum "is 
not analogous to the incident involving Ms. Little." Aplt. Br. 29-30. 
As with Verde, Calvert misunderstands Labrum. Labrum did not limit 
the applicability of a given 404(b) purpose to the facts of that case. If 
anything, Labrum supports the State's argument that rebutting self-defense 
is a proper purpose. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, if23; see also State v. High, 2012 
UT App 180, if48, 282 P.3d 1046 (explaining that gang affiliation evidence 
"may be probative to rebut a self-defense claim in some instances"). 
As explained, the doctrine of chances requires four foundational 
elements: materiality, similarity, independence, and frequency. Verde, 2012 
UT 60, iJ,57-61. Calvert argues that it is "patently obvious" that a single 
incident cannot show the doctrine of chances' frequency requirement, 
because the same misfortune must befall an individual "over and over." 
Aplt.Br. 31 (citing State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, 356 P.3d 173, cert. 
granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015)). But while more than one instance may 
increase the strength of a given inference, it is not logically required under 
the doctrine of chances. See, e.g., State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, ,r,I22-34, 
321 P.3d 243 (robbery case admitting evidence of one subsequent robbery 
under doctrine of chances). Even a single unlikely instance-such as a prior 
lottery win or one prior wife drowning in a bathtub-tends to show that the 
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second unlikely instance was not merely a fluke, but the result of the 
defendant's conscious actions. 
Calvert next argues that the trial court abused its discretion under 
rule 403 because the Holladay incident evidence merely showed his 
"reprehensible character," and had an "unusual propensity to unfairly 
prejudice" the jury against him. Aplt.Br. 32-33 (citation omitted). "[T]he 
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy" 
that should be used only "sparingly." Wheeler, 862 F.2d at 1408 (citation and 
quotation omitted). 
As explained, the existence of dual inferences- one proper, one 
improper- does not alone render other acts evidence inadmissible under 
rule 403. Rather, the evidence is excluded only where "the sole reason it is 
being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted in 
conformity with that character." Olsen, 869 P.2d at 1010 (citation and 
quotation omitted). As shown, the evidence here had the proper, 
noncharcter purposes of rebutting Calvert's claim of self-defense and 
implicit charge of fabrication. 
More importantly, the Holladay incident was not the sort of evidence 
that would have an "unusual propensity" to unfairly prejudice the jury 
against Calvert. Aplt.Br. 33. That kind of evidence includes "gruesome 
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crime scene photos, rape victims' sexual histories, and pseudoscientific 
methodologies." State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, ,I46, 335 P.3d 900. 
Compared to the charged acts, the Holladay incident was fairly tame 
because Calvert there did not draw and point a gun like he did here. That 
the other acts evidence was less shocking than the evidence of the charged 
acts shows that its tendency to unfairly prejudice Calvert was low. Lucero, 
2014 UT 15, ,I35 (holding under rule 403 that evidence of prior abuse not 
unfairly prejudicial because it was "tame in comparison to" evidence of 
charged conduct); cf State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ,I31, 8 P.3d 1025 (" evidence of 
multiple acts of similar or identical abuse is unlikely to prejudice a jury"). 
Calvert also asserts that because the legal proceedings regarding the 
Holladay incident were dismissed, it is "impossible to conclude" that it was 
not itself a false accusation. Aplt.Br. 35. But charging is no prerequisite, 
and acquittal is no bar, to the admission of 404(b) evidence. See Dowling v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1990); State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ~46, 
191 P.3d 17; State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ,I43 n.9, 28 P.3d 1278; Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ,I31. 
Calvert finally argues on this point that the h·ial court abused its 
discretion because it did not "scrupulously examine" the evidence. Aplt. Br. 
38. He asserts-without citation- that the trial court was "hard pressed to 
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make such a scrupulous examination if the evidence without an evidentiary 
hearing." Aplt.Br. 38. But Calvert never requested an evidentiary hearing 
below, and Utah appellate courts have never required one. Cf Cuttler, 2015 
UT 95, ,r,r8, 14 (relying on the State's "proffered evidence" to reverse trial 
court ruling excluding child sex abuse evidence under rule 403). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court must 
"scrupulously" examine 404(b) evidence "in the proper exercise" of its 
discretion. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, if 42, 28 P.3d 1278. There is no set 
procedure for trial courts to show a scrupulous examination. In the past, 
Utah courts have looked to the whole record to see if the trial court 
considered all the necessary factors. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner 2000 UT 
59, ifl6, 6 P.3d 1120 ("We review the record to determine whether the 
admission of [404(b)] evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial 
judge.") (citation and quotations omitted). Evidence of scrupulous 
examination-as contained in the parties' briefing and arguments, and the 
trial court's ruling- need not be overwhelming; it need show only that the 
trial court understood and applied the correct standard. See Widdison, 2001 
UT 60, ,r 44 (holding trial court conducted scrupulous examination where 
"the parties extensively briefed and argued the issue" of 404(b) evidence); 
State v. Nielsen, 2012 UT App 2, iJ16 n.3, 271 P.3d 817 (holding trial court 
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made "sufficiently scrupulous examination" where the "parties presented 
arguments at various times," and the trial court made "sufficient inquiry" 
into Shickles factors, even though it did "not expressly" identify them); 
Burke, 2011 UT App 168, if27 n.10 ("We acknowledge that ... the trial court 
simply ruled from the bench ... and did not enter any specific findings or 
conclusions. However, based on the evidence and argument before the trial 
court on this issue, it can be inferred that the trial court 'scrupulously 
examined' the relevant evidence."); State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, if 38, 
57 P.3d 1139 (holding trial court scrupulously examined evidence due to 
parties' briefing and arguments, even though it did not make "specific, 
detailed findings" on each point). 
Thus, scrupulous examination is not a high bar to clear. See, e.g., See 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, if44 (holding trial court conducted scrupulous 
examination because "the parties extensively briefed and argued the issue" 
of 404(b) evidence); Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, if34 (holding that scrupulous 
examination "can be inferred when the trial court has heard arguments on 
the relevant issues and has made 'sufficient inquiry"' into issues); Nielsen, 
2012 UT App 2, if16 n.3 (holding trial court made "sufficiently scrupulous 
examination" because the "parties presented arguments at various times" 
and the trial court made "sufficient inquiry" into rule 403, even though it 
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did "not expressly" identify factors; Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,I27 n.10 ("We 
acknowledge that ... the trial court simply ruled from the bench ... and did 
not enter any specific findings or conclusions. However, based on the 
evidence and argument before the trial court on this issue, it can be inferred 
that the trial court 'scrupulously examined' the relevant evidence."); 
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, if 38 (holding trial court scrupulously examined 
evidence based on parties' briefing and arguments, even though it did not 
make "specific, detailed findings" on each point); but see State v. Lowther, 
2015 UT App 180, if35, 356 P.3d 173 (reversing where "the trial court failed 
to scrupulously examine the proposed rule 404(b) evidence"), cert. granted, 
365 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015); State v. Thornton, 2014 UT App 265, if 47, 339 P.3d 
112 (reversing where trial court "did not engage in the scrupulous 
examination required'' under rule 404(b)), cert. granted, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah 
2015). 
The trial court's examination more than sufficed here. It received 
briefing and argument from both sides on the relevant facts and law, 
including the proper non-character purposes of disproving fabrication and 
self-defense. R93-108; R115-27; R283:7-29. It noted the Verde factors and 
adopted the State's characterization of them. R283:30. It explicitly found 
that the evidence's probative value was not outweighed "by the prejudicial 
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effect." Id. And the defense arguments were partially successful in that the 
court excluded one of the State's two proposed incidents as "a little bit too 
far afield." Id.; cf State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, if if 4, 40, 219 P.3d 75 
(holding scrupulous examination where trial court evaluated multiple other 
acts, admitting some and excluding another). All these facts show 
scrupulous examination. See Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, if34. 
In sum, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the 
Holladay incident to rebut his self-defense claim and argument that the 
other witnesses fabricated their testimony. 
Any error was harmless in any event because there was "no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ,I73, 311 P.3d 538 (citation 
and quotation omitted). The State's case against Calvert was 
overwhelming, the prosecutor did not use the prior assault in arguing 
Calvert's guilt here, and the trial court gave a curative instruction. State v. 
Ferguson, 2011 UT App 77, ,I,I19-20, 250 P.3d 89 (holding erroneous 
admission of 404(b) evidence harmless where evidence of guilt 
"overwhelming"); cf State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, if 29 n.8, 361 P.3d 104 
(holding no prejudice from co-defendant's invocation of Fifth Amendment 
privilege where "prosecutor did not rely on or refer to" it afterwards); 
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Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, if37 (holding no misuse of 404(b) evidence where 
trial court gave limiting instruction). 
First, the evidence of Calvert's guilt was overwhelming: seven 
eyewitnesses testified that Calvert threatened several children and adults 
with a gun and that he pointed the gun at Hugo. While Calvert's self-
serving testimony was inconsistent and incredible, the witnesses' testimony 
was consistent and corroborated. For example, Calvert told polilce that he 
did not have a loaded gun with a laser sight on it, but police found one in 
the garage just as witnesses said they would. R283:183-84, 303-09. Second, 
the prosecutor did not mention the Holladay incident in opening statement, 
closing arguments, or any other time. See R283:87-88; R284:129-36, 142-44. 
Third, Ms. Little's testimony of the Holladay incident was brief, spanning 
merely 10 pages of nearly 500 pages of trial transcript. R283:289-99. Its 
impact, therefore, was minimal. Finally, the trial court gave a limiting 
instruction. R200. Thus, there is "no reasonable likelihood that" admitting 
the Holladay incident "affected the outcome of the proceedings." Davis, 
2013 UT App 228, ,I173, 76. 
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IV. 
Calvert's ineffective assistance claim that the jury might have 
been exposed to improper material during deliberations 
because they had access to a prosecution laptop to listen to a 
911 call is entirely speculative. 8 
Calvert argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
to the jury's taking the prosecution's laptop into deliberations so that they 
could listen to the 911 call. Aplt.Br. 40. He asserts that counsel was 
required to object because the laptop was not evidence, and violated his 
rights to counsel and jury trial. Aplt.Br. 43-45. As explained, to prevail, 
Calvert must prove both (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. 
St1ickland, 466 U.S. at 689-92. And, again, proof of prejudice n1ust be based 
on a "demonsh·able reality and not a speculative matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d 
at 50. 
A. Counsel did not object when the prosecutor offered a laptop 
for the jury to listen to the 911 call, and the prosecutor 
explained that the laptop contained no case files. 
After the jury retired to deliberate, the court wanted to ensure that all 
of the exhibits "g[o]t back to the jury." R284:146. The prosecutor noted that 
one of the exhibits-the 911 recording-was a CD, and offered a laptop for 
the jury to use if they wanted to listen to it. Id. at 146-47. The trial court 
8 Calvert has also filed a motion for re1nand under rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the record on this claim. The 
State responds to that motion separately. 
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accepted the prosecutor's offer, and defense counsel did not object. 
R284:147. The jury was instructed that their verdict must be based II only on 
the evidence," which included "the testimony and exhibits presented at 
trial." R174. 
Before sentencing, defense counsel moved to arrest judgment based 
on, among other things, the jury's having potentially accessed something 
improper on the laptop. R204-13. Though counsel was present when the 
prosecutor offered the laptop to the court, R284:147, he now alleged that he 
had learned about it only "[s]everal days" after trial from some trial 
attendees. R209. Counsel argued that having the laptop accessible to the 
jury constituted "other good cause" under rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to arrest judgment because it might have injected "outside 
materials or influences" into the deliberations and created an "appearance 
of impropriety." R210. He proffered no evidence that the jury had used the 
laptop, let alone that it contained anything improper for the jury to view. 
R204-13. The prosecutor proffered that the laptop was just a tool to use 
during jury trials, and that it did not have any of his files, email, or case 
information on it. R219, 226-27. The prosecutor added that he had 
discussed the laptop with defense counsel at the time he made the offer, and 
that when defense counsel "expressed concern" about it, the prosecutor 
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"assured him the laptop contained no case files" and offered to let defense 
counsel "check the laptop himself." R226. Both parties then "left the 
room." Id. 
The trial court heard argument on the motion to arrest at sentencing. 
R282:13-14, 16-18. It denied the motion because "the laptop was controlled, 
it was only for the playing of the 9-1-1 call," and the court did not "see that 
it caused any taint at all." R282:21. 
B. Counsel reasonably decided not to object to the use of the 
prosecutor's laptop because there was - and is- no evidence 
that the jury used the laptop improperly. 
Calvert argues that the mere presence of the prosecutor's laptop 
during deliberations violated his right to counsel and right to jury trial, and 
that this Court should presume prejudice. Aplt.Br. 44-45. It is true that the 
c01nplete denial of counsel is structural error, for which prejudice is 
presumed. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,469 (1997). But Calvert 
was not denied counsel-he has been represented throughout both trial and 
appeal. 
It is also true that denial of the right to jury trial is structural error. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968). But Calvert also was not 
denied a jury trial-he got one. He cites no case-and the State is aware of 
none- holding that a defendant was deprived of the rights to counsel and 
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jury trial merely because the jury had access to a laptop supplied by the 
prosecution. 
Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions involving jury access to 
prosecution laptops appear overwhelmingly to find harmless error-
assuming they find any error at all. See People v. Foreman, case no. D055887, 
2010 WL 3705174, *8 (Cal. App., Sep. 23, 2010) (holding that trial court 
"could reasonably infer that jurors would have reported any improper use 
of the prosecutor's laptop"); Wright, 467 S.W.3d at 244 (rejecting claim 
where "Wright has not provided any proof that there was any prejudicial 
information on the Commonwealth's laptop" and "Wright has not 
produced any evidence that the jury impennissibly used the laptop to 
access the internet"); Crews v. Commonwealth, case no. 2012-SC-000596-MR, 
2013 WL 6730041, *6-7 (Ky., Dec. 19, 2013) ("The mere fact that jurors had 
limited access to the laptop does not create the presumption that they used 
it for an improper purpose."); State v. Mayle, case no. 11-0562, 2012 WL 
2914271, *3 (W.V., Feb. 13, 2012) (" Although the jury reviewed the audio on 
the prosecutor's laptop, there are no specific allegations of information 
gleaned from said laptop that was improper."); cf Weber v. State, 971 A.2d 
135, 154 (Del. 2009) (holding no error where prosecutor proffered that 
laptop contained no material related to case); State v. Jack, case no. 07-02-
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0309, 2013 WL 375538 (N.J. App., Feb. 1, 2013) ("The jurors can be seen 
intently watching the laptop screen, and there is no indication that they 
could have even seen" papers on the prosecution table, "or how any 
information otherwise visible on the papers may have affected their 
deliberations."). 
Not that there was any error here. Calvert cannot show deficient 
performance because, given the prosecutor's proffer, defense counsel could 
have reasonably decided that the laptop was nothing more than a tool to 
listen to evidence. And given the court's instruction to consider only the 
evidence in the case in reaching a verdict-that is, testhnony and exhibits, 
R174-counsel could have reasonably decided that the jurors, if they chose 
to use the laptop, would use it only to listen to the 911 call. 
Calvert also cites no case that a jury cannot access prosecution tools 
like a laptop to review evidence during deliberations. And a number of 
cases hold to the contrary. See, e.g., People v. Watson, case no. D056651, 2011 
WL 5117723, *18 (Cal. App., Oct. 27, 2011) (holding that prosecution laptop 
provided to jury was "not evidence, but only a device to allow viewing of 
the evidence"); Commonwealth v. Wright, 467 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Ky. 2015) 
(holding that prosecution laptop was equipment "used to play a recording 
in the jury deliberation room" and "need not be introduced into evidence"). 
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Thus, reasonable counsel could have reasonably concluded, under these 
circumstances, that there was nothing to object to. 
Nor can Calvert show prejudice where any harm is speculative. 
There is no evidence in the record that the jury accessed the prosecutor's 
laptop at all, let alone that they used it for purposes other than to listen to 
the 911 call admitted at trial. See State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, if 47, 357 
P.3d 554 (holding no prejudice from sending DVD of victim interview into 
deliberations where the "record does not suggest that the jury actually 
played the DVD ... during its deliberations"); see also State v. Maestas, 2012 
UT 46, iJ54, 299 P.3d 892 (holding no prejudice from failure to admonish 
jury where "there is nothing in the record to indicate that the failures to 
admonish played any role in the juror's conduct"); State v. Bossert, 2015 UT 
App 275, if if 41-42, 362 P.3d 1258 (upholding denial of mistrial motion based 
on allegedly improper jury contact where no evidence that the "theorized 
improper contact with the jury occurred"). 
In sum, Calvert has not shown that counsel was ineffective, nor 
shown a violation of his rights to counsel and jury trial, given that Calvert 




For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
April 30, 2014 
THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning. 
We're here in the matter of State of Utah vs. 
MR. CARLSON: Yes, your Honor. I believe 
12 defendant's counsel stepped out to use the restroom. 
Page 6 
13 THE COURT: Oh, I apologize. Okay. We'll wait for 






Good morning, Counsel. 
MR. PHILPOT: Good morning, your Honor. I 
THE COURT; No worries. 
We're--We are on the record in the matter of State 
20 of Utah vs. Calvert. We have a jury trial that's going to 
21 begin shortly, but prior to that, we've got a motion in limine 
22 that was filed by the State and we indicated that we could 
23 visit this before we engaged in the trial. 
24 So with that, Mr. Carlson, you may proceed. 





April 30, 2014 State of Utah v. Calvert 
Jury Trial 
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1 Your Honor, evidence of past acts is not admissible 
2 to show conformity, but as long as it's admitted for another 
3 purpose, it's okay, as long as it fits certain requirements. 
4 The State's proposal to introduce past acts evidence is for 
5 three purposes; first, to rebut a claim of fabrication which, 
6 according to State vs. Verde is allowed; second, to report--
7 rebut any claims of accident or mistake which is explicitly 
8 allowed under Rule 404(b) (2); and third, to rebut any claims 
9 of self-defense, which in State v. Labrum, the Court of 
10 Appeals also allowed. 
11 Under any of those rebuttal venues, the doctrine of 
12 chances is the best formula under 404(b) to evaluate that and 
13 there are four factors under the doctrine of chances. The 
14 State has to show materiality, that there's a bona fide 
15 dispute, similarity, that the past acts in the--occurring in 
16 the alleged allegation are similar, independence, that there's 
17 collaboration but that each event is independent of each other 





than a typical person would be exposed to those situations. 
On materiality--mater--fabrication, accident, 
mistake and self-defense are all in bona fide dispute. Now, 
under some of the theoretical and even--well, some of the 
23 scholarly papers that Verde cites, it suggests that the court 
24 wait to decide materiality until mid-trial, at the moment 
25 where the State wants to introduce it. That's not feasible. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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1 And under State v. Wittison, the court made it 
2 explicitly clear that when a defendant makes a claim at the 
3 time of the alleged offense, that claim can bring an issue 
4 into dispute. In this case, the defendant claimed that the 
5 alleged victim was lying, so fabrication has been brought into 
6 dispute by that. 
7 Similarly, he indicates that he was pointing the gun 
8 at the ground which is in direct contradiction of the victim 
9 that it was pointed directly at him, suggesting that if it did 
10 get directed at him, it would have been accidental or by 
11 mistake. 
12 Finally, he indicates that he called his neighbor, 
13 Mr. Majors, because he needed help and didn't have time to get 
14 his gun, suggesting that there's--there's some sort of desire 
15 for self-defense. On--materiality has been met under any of 
16 the three claims. ~ 
17 Similarly similarity has been met. The defendant's 
18 past threats to kill his other neighbors in 1999 and in 2008 
19 
20 
are roughly similar to the charged crime. 
Third, his independence. Once of these events is 
21 alleged to occur--have occurred in West Jordan. That's the--
22 the case being tried today. The previous event occurred in 
23 Holladay. And to the State's knowledge, the--Ms. Little in 
24 Holladay, doesn't know the Holguins in West Jordan. And the 
25 third event occurred in '99 in West Valley City and again, 
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1 Patrick Wall, to the State's knowledge, doesn't know Camille 
2 or the--or the Holguins. 
3 Finally, frequency. The defendant has threatened to 
4 kill and claimed self-defense more frequently than the typical 
5 personal would have been placed in that situa~ion. To the 
6 extent that I was able, I cited statistics and numbers in the 
7 filed motion but it--it's theoretically possible that someone 
8 would have to claim self-defense and threaten to kill a 
9 
10 
neighbor, unlikely, but the idea that that had to happen three 
separate times, it--it strains chance. I mean, under the 
11 doctrine of chances, it doesn't fit chance. 
12 Finally, even if the Court decides that, well, it's 
13 admissible for a proper under 404 (b) and under the doctrine of 
14 chances, it's admissible, the Court's supposed to do an 
15 evaluation under 403 to weigh whether it's outweighed 
16 substantially by other--unfair prejudice, confusing the 
17 issues, misleading the jury or undue delay. 
18 
19 
Now, a lot of these Shickles-type factors are over-
lapped with the doctrine of chances but there are some that 
20 are not, specifically the strength of the evidence of other 
21 
22 
act. Now, the strength of the evidence of the other acts is 
strong. In this case, there are witness statements from the 
23 alleged victims. In each of the previous cases, there are 
24 written statements from the alleged victims as well. 
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1 the efficacy of alternative evidence is--is low. This case 
2 ultimately comes down to--to who the jury is going to believe 
3 and in a--in a claim of credibility, the doctrine of chances 
4 is extraordinarily useful to the jury in determining what are 
5 the chances that this actually occurred so many times. 
6 And finally, other acts, these specific other acts 
7 would not rouse the jury to over-mastering hostility against 
8 the defendant. These are extraordinarily similar and so 
9 they're not something that they can say, well, he's--he's a 
10 bad person and therefore, we must convict. It's--it's almost 
11 identical as far as the--the past acts. 






the past acts evidence. 
THE COURT: All right. Very good. 
Response? 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes, your Honor. 
Your Honor, my comments may be fairly lengthy, I 
18 apologize in advance for that and for that purpose, I have 
19 filed an opposition motion if only for the convenience of the 
20 Court to follow along. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PHILPOT: By its motion in limine, the 
23 government asks the Court to allow the introduction of 
24 irrelevant and impermissibly prejudicial evidence pertaining 
25 to two past incidents involving the defendant, the first from 
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1 approximately 15 years ago, 1999, when defendant was charged 
2 with four traffic-related violations, the second from six 
3 years ago, 2008, when defendant and his co-resident were each 
4 charged with simple assault. In both instances, the charges 
5 were dismissed at the instigation of government prosecutors, 
6 not upon motion by defendant. In neither instance were there 
7 any court proceedings that produced sworn testimony and in 
8 large part, the government is here relying upon distant third- i 
9 party hearsay to even argue that the evidence should be 
10 introduced. 
11 Worse, the government makes gratuitous and enormous 
12 leaps in logic and further exaggerates wholly irrelevant and 
13 dissimilar circumstances to try and make these circumstances 
14 applicable under Rule 404(b) in the doctrine of chances 
15 theory. 
16 The truth, as ultimately admitted by the government 
17 by implication, is that it knows it cannot meet its 
18 evidentiary burden at trial and therefore seeks to paint 
19 defendant's reputation and credibility by showing he has a 
20 propensity to commit assault because of his allegedly bad 
21 character. Specifically, the government seeks to secure the 
22 Court's endorsement of its real argument that, because the 
23 defendant has shown the propensity and pattern of making 
24 verbal threats that in these two past instances amounted to 
25 nothing more than hyperbole, the jury should disbelieve any 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
April 30, 2014 State of Utah v. Calvert 
Jury Trial 
Page 12 
1 claim that his conduct in the present circumstance is lawful. 1, 
2 This strategy is impermissible and shocking. 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, if you wouldn't mind, I've got 
4 the brief sitting here in front of me. 
5 
6 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Instead of just reading the brief, why 
7 don't you summarize and tell me what the arguments are. 
8 
9 
MR. PHILPOT: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
I've got a couple extra pages in here to get rid of. 
10 First of all, number one, the government's motion to 
11 admit defendant's past act is really aimed at establishing the 
12 propensity to commit a crime. They--they go to great lengths 
13 to basically say they're rebutting four things; they're 
14 rebutting his claims of fabrication; two, they're rebutting 
15 the defendant's lack of mens rea; three, rebutting defendant's 
claim of self defense--excuse me, number two, accident or 
mistake. 






If such evidence is really aimed at establishing his l 
i 
propensity to commit a crime, it should be excluded despite a 
20 proper but unpersuasive legitimate purpose. The--
21 THE COURT: I--I'd agree you with 404(b) evidence if I/ 
22 it, in fact, is brought in for propensity reasons, it's not 
23 admissible, but there--there are reasons that 404 can come in. , 
24 And it seems like the reasons that Mr. Carlson have laid out 
25 are a11~-one of them is specifically excepted by 404(b) and 
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1 the other twos are--both--the other two are certainly allowed 
2 
3 
under the Verde case. What would be your response to that? 
MR. PHILPOT: I think the Verde case is very 
4 different and if you look at our motion, we spell out how 





very--that I think is very poignant, your Honor, in Verde. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I understand that Verde is a sex 
case and it doesn't have anything to do with the subject 
matter here, but nonetheless, it talks about ways to get 
; 
10 404 (b) evidence in, l specifically under the doctrine of chances 1 i 






What is your response with regard to the doctrine of 
MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, that's point number two in 
16 my brief and I can, again, you've asked me not to read through 
17 and so, rather, I would say--I would attack, first of all, 
18 their materiality. They attempt this to place fabrication, 
19 accident, mistake and self-defense at issue, but claiming that 
20 someone is lying is not the same as a sole eye witness 
21 fabricating elements of testimony. 
22 So the Verde decision--
23 THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. Say that one more 
24 time? 
25 MR. PHILPOT: Claiming that someone is lying--
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THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: --is not the same as saying that a 
sole eye witness has fabricated elements of his testimony. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PHILPOT: And Verde admitted only to the 
theoretical possibility. 
THE COURT: Theoretical possibility of what? 
MR. PHILPOT: That evidence of prior misconduct 
could be admitted under Rule 404(b) to establish commission of 
10 criminal acts of reas by rebutting the charge of fabrication. 
11 THE COURT: Well, we're talking about--the 
12 fabrication is not by a third party, the fabrication is 
13 alleged by your own--by your client, so that's not a third 
14 party, that's the first party; right? 
15 
16 
MR. PHILPOT: Well, they're saying also that Mr. 





17 people contradict themselves. And so I think they're not just i 
18 saying that my client--they're not just alleging that my 
19 client may be fabricating inform--or lying, they're alleging 
20 other people may be lying as well. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Well, it wouldn't make any difference 
what other people are saying. 404(b) only applies to your 
23 client. So the question then is not if some other witness 
24 comes over and says they saw something completely different, 
25 that would not allow 404(b) evidence to come in. The only 
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1 thing 404(b) would allow would be what your client is claiming 
2 and in this case, your--the State's claiming that your client 
3 is saying he was acting in self-defense, it was an accident 
4 and that the person that--that is making the allegations have 
5 actually fabricated those things. 
6 MR. PHILPOT: And your Honor--okay. Let's go--let's 
7 go to mistake. They--we're not actually claiming that, we 
8 make that clear in our motion. 
9 THE COURT: Well, I think what--what the claim is 
10 that in fact your client is indicating that the laser he was 
11 pointing was pointed at the ground and so the State's asking 
12 me to make a leap to say the victim or the alleged victim in 
13 this matter is claiming no, the laser was actually pointed at 
14 me. So if you get from the ground, from your client saying to· 
15 
16 
get from the ground up to the person, the State's saying that 
your client is saying, well, there was obviously some mistake 
17 because that was not my intent, I didn't plan to put the laser 
18 on him, I was pointing at the ground and somehow it ended up 
19 on top of him. And that's the State's premise with regard to 
20 mistake. 
MR. PHILPOT: Yeah. And we just disagree with that. 
THE COURT: Okay. And--
MR. PHILPOT: I mean, we're not saying that his 





25 THE COURT: Right. Then how did the laser get from 
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the ground to--to--onto the--
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i 
1 
MR. PHILPOT: Lawful acts by my client. 
THE COURT: Lawful acts? 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes, your Honor. Lawful and 
defensible. 
THE COURT: So you're talking self-defense? 
i 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes, your Honor. Affirmative defense. j 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about self-defense 
then. 
Self-defense is also another reason that 404(b) 
evidence can come in. If your client is claiming the reason 
he did this was under self-defense, then how is it under the 
doctrine of chances that this exact same scenario happened on 










MR. PHILPOT: It did not, they're not similar and 
that's what we argue, your Honor. I--I'm happy to continue 
going through each element if you'd like--
THE COURT: Well, I just want to have a discussion, 
I don't want you to read your brief to me, I can read my--
MR. PHILPOT: Okay. 
THE COURT: --your brief myself. So tell me--tell 
me what--why it is it doesn't apply to a self-defense motion. 
MR. PHILPOT: Why the doctrine of chances doesn't 
24 apply? 
25 THE COURT: Right. Exactly. I mean, there are 
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1 specific requirements the Supreme Court put down with regard 
2 to Verde as far as the doctrine of chances, where the party's 
3 independent. Well, the alleged victims in this case and the 
4 two cases that Mr. Carlson is talking about, they don't know 
5 each other, they were actually distant in terms of geography 
6 as well, they didn't live in the same area. So the doctrine 
7 of chances says, what are the odds that these same people 
8 could bring very similar charges or allegations against your 
9 client and all be completely independent? And the doctrine of 
10 chances says, the chances of, okay, in this case somebody 
11 brings a false claim allegedly against your client that he 
12 pointed a gun with a laser on top of it at them. Okay. That-
13 -that's the claim here, but we have another person that's 
14 making a very similar claim and those two cases are very 
j 
15 independent. Then we've got a third case where they're making, 
a very similar claim. Again, all three making--16 
17 MR. PHILPOT: I don't think they are making a very 
18 similar claim. 
THE COURT: Tell me why they aren't. 
MR. PHILPOT: That's why I'm getting a little 
confused--
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PHILPOT: --by what you're saying because 







25 THE COURT: Tell me why they're not similar. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 




MR. PHILPOT: First of all, the claim that my client 
2 is--has a gun with a laser pointer, there was no--there was no 




THE COURT: But I think--but I think what he's 
talking about, not--is not necessarily the gun, but the 









MR. PHILPOT: Well, no--no, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why weren't they? 
MR. PHILPOT: First of all, we're not even sure the 
threats existed. The prosecution dropped them at their own 
accord. 
THE COURT: Well, that's a strain to the evidence 





don't think the threats were similar. 
MR. PHILPOT: In the current situation--
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: --there is no claim that the--that 
20 the--that our client threatened somebody's life. So the--you 





THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: --you have a weapon--























With a laser pointer. And our--my 
to get off his property. In the other 
5 cases, supposedly my client is making threats against life 
19 






in another where my client is assaulted by someone who the ~ 





approached by other people at his own property. 
The factual circumstances and the ability to get to 
the truth of the circumstances of the present situation are 
completely different from fifteen years ago and six years ago 
where the circumstances giving rise to actions by my client 
14 thereafter are completely different. And what the State is 
15 saying is that we're supposed to look at these three instances 
16 arising from completely different circumstances where weapons 
17 are not involved in the other two and suppose that, for some 
18 reason, because of hearsay, we now assume that those things 





THE COURT: Did he claim self-defense in those other 
two instances? 
MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, he claimed, again, if 
24 we're to believe the allegations of the State, that he was, in 
25 one instance, reacting to the attack of another person. 
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Okay. How about the other one? 
The other one was a traffic accident. 
Okay. 
Where two vehicles--where his vehicle 
crashed into another. 
is. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I know what a traffic accident 
I'm wondering--but something escalated beyond a traffic 
10 accident, did it not? It says--he said the defendant--the 
11 defendant said he was going to kill me so that's the reason he 
12 did what he did was for self-defense reasons, was it not? It 
13 did--you're right, there was a traffic accident involved, but 
14 the traffic accident was precipitated, Wall reported to the 
15 police officer, drove his car directly at Wall's car, swerving 
16 out of the way at the last minute, crashing into another 
17 vehicle. The defendant then called me a mother fucker and 
said he was going to kill me, reached for the glove box, I 
said, Go ahead and pull your gun out. 
18 
19 
20 MR. PHILPOT: I'm not sure how that qualified, I'm--
21 I guess by some stretch of the imagination that qualifies as 
22 self-defense, he swerved--again, this--this goes back to where 
23 I--I think that they're--that the State is really stretching 
24 the elements of the different cases separated by great time--
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1 approaching each other, one swerves, a man gets mad at the 
2 other person because his car crashes into another object is 
3 similar to a man at his home at night, arguably with a weapon 
4 where other hostile individuals have come. 
5 
6 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, those are the only facts I 
know. We'll ask Mr. Carlson to elaborate. Actually, why 
7 don't I do it right now. 
8 Mr. Carlson, you can stay right there, Mr. Philpot, 
9 'cause I'm going to ask more questions. Would you elaborate 
10 on that situation and tell me why it is, where the self-






MR. CARLSON: In the West Valley situation--
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CARLSON: --your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CARLSON: And this--I'm referencing Page 10 of 
17 17 on my motion. 
18 
19 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CARLSON: Specifically No. 5. In each incident, 
20 the defendant suggested he was not the aggressor. 
21 In West Valley, the defendant allegedly told Capwell 
22 to get out of his way and then drove away and that--that 
23 admittedly is a weaker--a weaker self-defense situation than 
24 the Holladay situation where he explicitly said that he was 
25 just trying to protect himself from Camilla Little. 
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Anything else, Mr. Philpot? 
MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, just perhaps the Supreme--
4 a court case that I think is--that we've quoted, United States 
5 v. Romero. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: I think this is very telling. One 
8 cannot present evidence, the relevance of which is based on 
9 the forbidden inference, the person did "X" in the past, 
10 therefore, he probably has a propensity for doing "X" and 
11 therefore, he probably did "X" this time, too. 
12 
13 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: That's exactly what they're saying 
14 he's doing. They're also--
15 
16 
THE COURT: Well, that's the definition of 404 (b) 
evidence; right? That there are exceptions to that and it's 
17 built right in the rule. 
18 
19 
MR. PHILPOT: Yeah. And we would--yes. And we 
would say this is an impermissible application. If--if this 
20 is allowed, it is an impermissible allowance. 
21 
22 
The--the government has admitted right in their 
brief that if they don't have this, the jury will not be able 
23 to make heads or tails of the multiple claims that seem to 
24 contradict each other and--and so it's significantly 
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1 have the ability to prosecute the defendant at this time 
2 unless you give us this to--to demean his character so that we 
3 can convince the jury that he is a bad character. In other 
4 words, they're saying the credibility of our wit--of our 
5 witnesses is at issue and because the credibility of our 
6 witnesses is at issue, you've got to show these instances of 





THE COURT: But I think you just--
MR. PHILPOT: It's extremely prejudicial. 
THE COURT: Well, you just made the perfect argument 
12 for probability of chances, though; right? I mean, under the 
13 Verde case, there was one little boy that was claiming this 
14 guy had done something to him sexually and the point of the 
15 case is that that little boy's credibility might be undermined 
16 on some level, so what we're going to do is we're going to 
17 bring other little boys that are completely independent of 
18 this little boy to say the same thing happened to them. 
19 MR. PHILPOT: Against a defendant who lied 
20 specifically about the act itself for which he was accused. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Well, how did he lie? 
MR. PHILPOT: He lied about the act, said he did not 
23 do the act. 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PHILPOT: In this case,--
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THE COURT: If he were clairning--do you're saying--a 
2 say--a claim of self-defense if it's not true, would that be a 
3 lie? ~ 
4 MR. PHILPOT: If a claim of--yes, that would be a 
5 lie. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. So that's what we're talking 
7 about here; right? The government's claiming that your--your 




MR. PHILPOT: I don't think that's the application 
11 of Verde. I think the application of the doctrine of chances 
12 is that you have an act which is--which is illegal which has 
13 been committed, for example, by my--let's say by my client and 






THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: --with a deadly weapon. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: That's not what they're saying here. 
They're not saying that because he assaulted people with a 
20 deadly weapon in the past, he assaulted people with a deadly 
21 weapon now. They're saying because of these things, amorphous 
22 things surrounding totally different, whereas in Verde, you've 
23 got a--a defendant who says I didn't do that act, I didn't 
24 sexually assault, in this case, the--the prosecution is saying 
25 my client committed assault with a deadly weapon. And then 
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1 they're saying in--in these other instances, it's not assault 





THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PHILPOT: It's not even close. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure that's a requirement. The-
-I think the claim of the State is that your client had a run-
7 in with someone else where he claimed that he made the same 
8 self-defense claim, so they're saying what are the odds that 
9 one person who have self-defense claimed in two separate 
10 occasions? I guess that's what they're asking. 
11 MR. PHILPOT: Even if that were the appropriate 
12 question to ask, in Verde, I'd say it's highly likely, so I 
13 don't think the doctrine of chances--there's a very high 
14 chance that--that would not occur. But I don't think that is 




16 inappropriately, is that the--the instances, which are not at 1 
17 all like the allegation in the current instance, have things 
18 floating around them, which we're going to piece together to 
19 apply, unlike Verde like Verde. And I know that's--sounds a 
20 little odd. But Verde was very specifically getting at the 
21 lying about the act for which the person was accused. 
22 THE COURT: But the Verde lists a number of reasons 
23 that that also would apply and if they're saying here that 
24 your client made unlawful threats against someone and then 
25 claimed self-defense, as they're claiming happened in this 
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1 case, they're saying--I agree with you with regard to the 
2 traffic offense, I don't think that there's much on line 
3 there, but with regard to the other instance, I think they're 
4 claiming he made--again made unlawful threats against someone 
5 and then was called on it, he claimed self-defense; right? 
6 MR. PHILPOT: The--that's actually, theoretically, 
7 that's a good question because the prosecution decided not to 
8 pursue whether or not he was telling the truth and so we don't 
9 know, we don't know why the prosecution decided to not--I 
10 mean, it may be that he was absolutely justified, it may br 
11 that self-defense didn't matter, I mean, allegedly he claimed 
12 it is what they're saying. So I--and as I look--if I were to 
13 argue on those cases, I would say that I'm not sure self-
14 defense is really--well, they allege he said self-defense. 
15 I'm--I'm not sure that the prosecution felt that was really 
16 what's at issue in this cases, which is why I thin it's an 
17 atrocity to take their theories which do not appear to be 
18 based in reality and allow them to dictate the opinions of the 
19 
20 
jury today relative to my client. 
THE COURT: The theories that aren't related--
21 aren't--tell me what that means, the theories that aren't 
22 
23 
based on reality. What's that? 
MR. PHILPOT: They have had--they have--and I 
24 apologize if I'm not making sense, your Honor, but they have 
25 taken a standard--
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THE COURT: What standard? 
MR. PHILPOT: --of the--
THE COURT: The Verde? 
MR. PHILPOT: --Verde standard--
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PHILPOT: --of the doctrine of chances, which is, 
7 a completely different case than what's at issue today. They 
8 have taken today's case and tried to measure it against two 
9 other completely different cases and picked little things out 
10 of the air that never came to a head or came to issue in those 
11 cases, but instead--
12 THE COURT: Came--when you say "came to a head," 
13 what do you mean? 
14 MR. PHILPOT: The prosecution did not--he was not 




THE COURT: Well, the other little boy in the--in 
18 the Verde case, he wasn't even--that person--that defendant 
19 
20 
was not even charged with those cases. 
MR. PHILPOT: He was not even charged. I thought 
21 he--I understand that, your Honor but he was charged with the 
22 
23 
same act in each instance, so when--when he came to--
THE COURT: No. No. No. No, he wasn't. He wasn't 
24 charged with the--the--
25 MR. PHILPOT: Excuse me, your Honor. I--I'm sorry. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 






THE COURT: --the other victims in--before--before--
MR. PHILPOT: Right. 
THE COURT: There were little boys in the 







MR. PHILPOT: He was alleg--excuse me, I misspoke. 
He was alleged to have committed the same act. 
THE COURT: Right. But you just said that--
MR. PHILPOT: The same criminal act. 
THE COURT: Right. But--
MR. PHILPOT: In this case, my client is not alleged 
11 to have committed the same criminal act. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. Thank 




Mr. Carlson, response? 
MR. CARLSON: Very briefly, your Honor. 
On materiality, the State acknowledges that if, as 
17 defense counsel asserts, that if there's not any claim of 
18 mistake or accident, that that's not on the table, then 
19 there's no materiality for that an that purpose is out the 
20 window at the beginning. 
21 What remains are the claims of fabrication and the 
22 claims of self-defense. Verde is extraordinarily similar to 
23 this situation in that in Verde, the defendant said little boy 
24 is lying. Here, the defendant said, they're laying. At the 
25 date--the difference being the defendant said it at the date 
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1 of the defense, Verde said it at trial and the court had the 
2 chance to review everything. 
3 Additionally, on that specific claim of fabrication, 
4 the West Valley City case is very relevant because in the West 
5 Valley City case, the defendant said he's going to kill him 
6 and reaches in his glove box to the point where Patrick Wall 
7 believes he's going for a gun to the point where he says, Go 
8 ahead and grab your gun, which as happens is exactly what--
9 what occurred in the instant case. 
10 As far as the similarity, the State is not alleging 
11 that these instances are identical, as if the defendant's 
12 establish a modus operandi. We're not trying to establish 
13 identity where--where almost identical situations would be 
14 necessary, but for claims of fabrication, claims of self-
15 defense, which are permissible purposes under State v. Labrum, 
16 the defendant's actions and claimed justifications are 
17 relevant for the jury, not to--not to establish a propensity 
18 that he's a bad neighbor, but to allow the jury to say, well, 







against two or three separate neighbors? What are the chances ~ I 
that three different neighbors have said this guy has 
threatened to kill me and this--and this neighbor is lying? 
23 And for those reasons, we would ask that the 
24 evidence be admitted. 
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1 brief and I apologize, I don't remember, how will you 
2 introduce that evidence? 
3 
4 
MR. CARLSON: It would be specifically with--with 
leave of the Court, it would be through three witnesses. It 
5 would be through Patrick Wall, Camilla Little and Officer 
6 
7 
Imidge in West Valley City. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I find that based upon the 
8 standards set out in Verde, I believe the State has met all of 
9 their goals--all of the--the requirements from Verde as argued 
10 by Mr. Carlson. 
11 The traffic incident, I think, is a little bit far 
12 afield and for that reason, I'm not going to allow that one 
13 in, but the other incident, however, I believe that's the 
14 Holladay matter, I do believe fits under all of those. I 
15 don't think that it's a--I don't think it's being brought in 
16 for propensity under 404(b), I believe it's coming in to rebut 
17 one of the noted factors, that being fabrication as well as 
18 self-defense. 
19 Then I look under the doctrine of chances and all of 
20 the elements as explained by Mr. Carlson have been laid out. 
21 Lastly, I weigh the 403 balancing and I find that 
22 the probative value, in fact, outweighs being substantially--
23 is not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. So 
24 for that reason, that--the evidence concerning that instance 
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I've got a laptop if they--if they 
Very good. We'll let them listen to 
We have 12 exhibits. 
We shouldn't, what--what was the 
The State's Exhibit No. 7. 
7 . I have 7, I have 7 plus 4. Is that-
10 -that's eleven; right? 









No. 2 of the 9-1-1 telephone call. 
No. 3 is the large picture of Hugo's house again. 
No. 4 is another large picture of the house. 
5 is a picture of the gun. 
6 is a picture of the gun. 
And 7 is a picture of the garage that came in this 
20 Then for the defense, we've got the Canales witness 
21 statement, the Andrew Holguin witness statement, the Araht 
22 Holguin witness statement--I guess I shouldn't say Holguin--
23 Holguin witness statement, and 4 is Kelsey Pitts' witness 
24 statement. And those are everything I have. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
July 1, 2014 
THE COURT: Please be seated. 
Page 3 
Good afternoon. We're here today for the Tuesday 
afternoon criminal calendar. Who is ready to start us out? 
MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, we're ready to handle the 
12 Calvert matter. 
13 THE COURT: Very good. Come on forward. 
14 All right. Let's call the case of the State of Utah 





Good afternoon, Mr. Calvert. 
MR. CALVERT: Good afternoon, your Honor. 
THE COURT: There were two things in front of me 
today with regard to this case. The first--let me pull it up 
20 here--the first is Mr. Philpot's motion to arrest judgment on 
21 the jury verdict and the second then, based on how this one 




of Mr. Calvert. 
So with that, Mr. Philpot, you may proceed. 
MR. PHILPOT: Thank you, your Honor. 
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1 I would like to begin by quoting from the State's 
2 opposition to my motion to arrest. 
3 
4 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PHILPOT: Quote: The State did not introduce 
5 evidence that the defendant intended to harm Hugo Holguin 
6 
7 
because the law does not require it. That is determinative 
and irreconcilable. 
8 There are cases very clear in the State of Utah, one 1; 
9 of which is Loffel which requires intent, says where 
10 circumstances like this, where the statute does not specify 
11 what the mens rea is, the default is intent, where the State 
12 says we didn't argue intent, then--
13 THE COURT: I think the default, if I--if I--if I'm 
14 correct in that and maybe--I think the statute actually says 
15 if it's not--if the mens rea is not particularly described in 
16 the statute, then it defaults to intentionally, knowingly or 













recklessness, they--and they 
is correct, your Honor. 
the State did not present any 
did not present anything on 
admit now that they did not 
21 
22 
23 present anything on intent. And Loffel makes very clear that 
24 they need to have one of those; in fact, there's--










points a gun at another person, you don't think that's 
recklessly assaulting that person? 
MR. PHILPOT: Well, I would imagine that there's 
4 some circumstance out there where it could be but that's not 
5 applicable in this case. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: Tell me why it's not. 
MR. PHILPOT: It was not argued, there was no 




THE COURT: You mean there's no evidence that your 
client pointed the gun with the laser at one of these people? 
MR. PHILPOT: Well, then I would say Oldroyd 
12 clarifies that it's not enough just to show or display a gun. 
T~E COURT: Tell me what would have to happen. 13 
14 MR. PHILPOT: They would have to prove that he had 
15 the intent to do or the intent to cause bodily harm. 
THE COURT: Okay. Tell me how you do that. 16 
17 MR. PHILPOT: Well, they have to show--I don't--I 

















Give me an example. 
Some indication that 
Could he point a gun at 
No--
If I point a gun at you 





right now, am I 






MR. PHILPOT: Not if it's conditioned, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Conditioned on what? 
MR. PHILPOT: If it's conditioned upon statements 
4 continuously admitted to by everybody who testified that it 
5 was qualified by get off my property. Because this isn't a--
6 this isn't a barroom brawl or a parking lot brawl where 
7 somebody comes out and they're fighting in a parking lot and 
8 he whips out a gun, he's angry, points the gun or he's hood 
9 on, invading a home; this is a man in his own home who comes 
10 out, is approached by somebody else, conditions--every 
11 statement, every witness that testified said that he said get 





THE COURT: Well, the only--
MR. PHILPOT: And so the intent is--
THE COURT: --the only problem was, though, there 
was a lot of credible evidence indicating that he never really 




MR. PHILPOT: He admits--
THE COURT: So where did that put us--
MR. PHILPOT: He admitted that he came off the prop-
21 -on the property. He admitted that there were witnesses who 
22 admitted he came over, inebriated, that he came over, angry. 
23 And so--and so let's move to the next step, the presumption 
24 where--where in defense of habitation, if the State says we've 
25 presented no evidence of intent, then there's a presumption 
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that he has--that he's acting reasonably, that his intent is 
2 reasonable. And if they again say we've presented no evidence 
3 of intent, the law does not require us to, then how do you 
4 overcome the presumption that he acted reasonably in defense 




THE COURT: Wait a minute. I--
MR. PHILPOT: There's no evidence--
THE COURT: --I'm still having a hard time 
9 understanding how it is you could point a gun at somebody and 
10 
11 
under a reckless standard would not be threatening that 
person. If that were to go--if that gun were to go off and 
12 kill that person, under a reckless standard--under a--that 
13 might be manslaughter or something less than that, 
14 nonetheless, by pointing an item at another person that 
15 potentially could cause death, why wouldn't that be reckless? 
16 MR. PHILPOT: The jury was instructed that he had to 
17 have the intent to have bodily harm, to do--to do bodily harm, 
18 or the threat--or a threat to do bodily injury. And they--
19 THE COURT: You mean just as far as the--are we just 
20 talking about the assault? 
21 MR. PHILPOT: Yes. The intent to commit the 
22 assault. 
23 THE COURT: So you think pointing a gun at a person 
24 is not a threat; is that what you're telling me? 
25 MR. PHILPOT: 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
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THE COURT: Whoa. Whoa. Whoa. Tell me how that 
depends. If I point a gun at you, give me the instance that 
4 would not be a threat. 
5 MR. PHILPOT: When we're playing capture the flag 
6 with fake guns, we're--you're--
7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Fair enough. Let--
8 okay. Let me--let me change the facts. If I have a real gun 
9 with a laser on it--
10 
11 
MR. PHILPOT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: --and I point it at you, tell me when 
12 that would not be a threat? 
13 
14 
MR. PHILPOT: Defense of habitation. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's a whole different issue, 
15 though. We aren't talking about defense of habitation, we're 




MR. PHILPOT: It's not just the threat, it's--
THE COURT: --tell me how that wouldn't be a threat. 
20 MR. PHILPOT: It's not just a threat, it's a threat 
21 to do bodily injury. And the--the appeals court has clarified 
22 unlawful, that it has to be--the intent can't just--excuse me, 
23 not Loffel, Oldroyd, it can't just be somebody displays a 
24 weapon, waves it around, they have to prove that there's an 
25 intent to do bodily injury. 
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And what we heard in evidence is there was--so I--I 
could maybe grant you that there's a threat, a threat to get 
off my property--
THE COURT: Or a threat to do bodily injury because 






MR. PHILPOT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. So that would be a threat then. 
MR. PHILPOT: That would be an attempt and that's 
THE COURT: No, that wouldn't be an attempt. It 
11 says and a threat accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
12 violence to do bodily harm to another. 
13 If I point a gun at you, tell me why that would not 
14 be a threat to cause you harm 
15 
16 
MR. PHILPOT: Because--it could be a threat, but it-
-that's not the--that's not the statute, the statute is a 




THE COURT: What else would it be a threat to do? 
MR. PHILPOT: To--to get off my property. 
THE COURT: No. No. No. No. A threat--if I point 
21 a gun at you, why wouldn't that threaten bodily injury? The 
22 only reason it would threaten bodi--the only reason it's a 
23 threat is 'cause if I--if I pointed a pen at you, this isn't a 
24 threat; right? 
25 MR. PHILPOT: Well, I--
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THE COURT: Because I can't do anything wrong with 
2 it. But if I point at you, the reason it's a threat is 
3 
4 
because I pull the trigger and I'll--and you're dead. 
MR. PHILPOT: I--I disagree, your Honor. I think 
5 there can be moments where a person points a pen at somebody 
6 and--
7 THE COURT: Okay. Right now, I'm--right now, I'm 
8 pointing this pen at you--
MR. PHILPOT: Right. 
THE COURT: --am I threatening you right now? 










THE COURT: Okay. If I put a loaded gun right now 
and pointed it at you, would I--would I be threatening you? 
MR. PHILPOT: Possibly--possibly, but--
THE COURT: Possibly? 
MR. PHILPOT: Yeah, I--your--your Honor--
THE COURT: How is it that pointing a loaded gun 
18 another person would not be a threat? 
19 MR. PHILPOT: Because the--the courts have 
20 clarified, the appeals courts in particular and the Supreme 
21 Court in particular, that it's not enough to threaten--
22 THE COURT: Under what case? 
at 
23 MR. PHILPOT: Oldroyd and Loffel, L-o-f-f-e-1. That 
24 it's not enough--
25 THE COURT: Not enough to point a gun at another 
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1 person to threaten them? That's what you're telling me? 
2 MR. PHILPOT: Specifically Oldroyd makes it clear 
3 
4 
that simply displaying and waving it around--
THE COURT: We're not talking about displaying and 
5 waving it. We're talking about pointing the gun at another 





MR. PHILPOT: Okay. 
THE COURT: That's not displaying or--if I show you 
it in my waistband, I agree, I haven't threatened you. If I 
wave it around over here, I haven't threatened you. When I 
11 put that laser beam on your body, now you're being threatened. 
12 Do you agree? 
MR. PHILPOT: Possi--no, I won't, because my--
THE COURT: Okay. All--










THE COURT: So whether it's true or not, it doesn't 
MR. PHILPOT: No, that's not--
THE COURT: But that's what you just said, you said 
21 I can't do it 'cause it's against his interest. I'm asking 
22 you whether or not that's the truth or not. 
23 MR. PHILPOT: No, you're asking--you're asking me to 
24 hypothesize on what may be and I don't want to do that when 
25 the state's already admitted--
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THE COURT: No, I'm not--I'm--I'm asking you to 
2 consider the facts that I saw in this trial and the facts in 
3 the trial were there were people that saw him put this laser 




















--and if his intent was to 
10 his property, then that is not aggravated assault. 
THE COURT: Okay. I--
MR. PHILPOT: If his intent--
THE COURT: --I understand your argument. 
MR. PHILPOT: Okay. 







16 MR. PHILPOT: I--I've already mentioned to you the 
17 presumption of reasonableness which comes with the self-
18 defense of habitation. 
19 
20 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PHILPOT: And if there's an admission that there 
21 is no evidence presented on intent, then--and--and also, my 
22 understanding, no evidence presented on recklessness or 
23 
24 
knowledge, and if there was--
THE COURT: No evidence--okay, when you say no 
25 evidence, you're not saying--
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MR. PHILPOT: It was not part of the State's--
THE COURT: --you're not saying that--as long as 
we're clear, there was evidence that he lifted the gun and put 
4 the laser beam on the person's body, but your contention would 
5 be that that would not be evidence. 
6 MR. PHILPOT: My contention is the State 
7 acknowledges that they did not introduce evidence, they say 
8 that affirmatively in their opposition. 
9 
10 
THE COURT: All right. What else? 
MR. PHILPOT: Finally, your Honor, the laptop. 
11 Allowing the laptop to go back in any case is unreasonable. 
12 There was a Supreme Court case--
13 
14 
THE COURT: In any case is unreasonable? 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes. Yes. Unless it's the laptop of 
15 the Court. But when it's the prosecution's laptop, that is 
16 unreasonable. 
17 There was a Supreme Court case last week on a 
18 different facts but similar principle, it was Riley vs. 
19 California where the State argued that if somebody has a 
20 wallet and a cell phone, the cell phone should be treated as a 
21 wallet. And the Supreme Court said a wallet--or a--a cell 
22 phone is not like a wallet because it's a multitude of 
23 information and opportunities that a person has to do all 
24 sorts of things and to gather all sorts of information. 
25 A laptop? I mean, there are cases where if a 
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THE COURT: Right, but let's say in this--




4 THE COURT: --in this case that when the jury wanted 




play the call for them and bring the laptop back out. 
that infected the jury? 
Has 
MR. PHILPOT: Hypothetically, if that happened, yes, 
9 it still taints the jury, it destroys the--




MR. PHILPOT: It destroys the notions of fairness. 
It makes it impossible for the public to believe that the jury 
14 is beyond reproach. Can I send my laptop every time? Can I 








THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. PHILPOT: I don't think so. No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Very good. 
Mr. Carlson? 
MR. CARLSON: I'm going to address these in the 
22 order that we addressed in the motion--
23 
24 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. CARLSON: --specifically. We're going to talk 
25 about mens rea first. The State agrees, we did not establish 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
July 1, 2014 State of Utah v. Calvert 
Sentencing 
Page 15 
1 intent to cause injury. There weren't injuries in this case 
2 and under the old version, pre-2010 of the Code, to get a 
3 second-degree felony, the State had to prove that the 
4 defendant intended to cause bodily harm. And so the mens rea 
5 was about, not the action but the result of that action. 
6 Now, that wasn't the law in this case and we weren't 
7 asserting injury, we weren't asserting a second-degree felony 
8 but a third-degree felony. We were saying that with the 
9 defendant engaged in the assaultive conduct, he did so 
10 intentionally or knowingly. Loffel says we also could have 
11 instructed the jury on recklessly, but we didn't do that here. 
12 The State's position is that even under the 
13 defendant's version of events, he pointed that loaded gun at 
14 Hugo Holguin. It wasn't an accident that it came up, he 
15 intentionally pointed the loaded gun at Hugo Holguin and he 
16 told Adon Holguin, if you don't get out of here, there's going 
17 to be a mess up, as he did so. 
18 All of this indicates that his actions were 
19 intentional or at the very least, knowing, when he engaged in 
20 that behavior. Again, the mens rea is not about the result of 
21 the conduct but the conduct itself. 
22 As far as the defense of self and defense of 
23 habitation, this is where the jury came down to credibility. 
24 The defendant's version of events was so drastically different 
25 from the version of every other witness who testified, the 
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1 jury had no choice but to weigh the credibility. And they 
2 considered the factors that are appropriate and that they were 
3 instructed to do so. Accordingly, they decided that the 
4 testimony of all nine other witnesses that saw what happened 
5 that day was more credible than the defendant's version and 
6 that he was not acting in defense of habitation or defense of 
7 self. 
8 Finally, as far as the laptop, the State pays part 
9 of the light bills in this building and--and the jury used the 
10 light to look at the evidence that day. But the fact that 
11 they used something that the State provided to consider the 
12 evidence doesn't taint that evidence. The only case that 
13 defense counsel cites is a Supreme Court of Florida case where 
14 the jury was given an article that says defense attorneys 
15 attack prosecutors and victims. That clearly invites the jury 
16 to look at the evidence through a certain lens. That's in 
17 direct contrast to the laptop, which is a tool to present the 
18 information that was admitted into evidence. The fact that it 
19 theoretically could have been abused--and I want to be clear, 
20 there is no indication from anyone that it was abused, this is 
21 just a hypothesis that it could have been abused, should not 
22 disqualify because as Riley vs. California makes clear, most 
23 of us carry around our lives in our pockets now with a smart 
24 phone. And this Court acknowledged that when it instructed th 
25 jury not to look at outside evidence and not to use their 
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smart phones but simply to focus on the evidence in this case. · 
We gave the jury the tool to listen to the CD that 
was admitted into evidence, without objection. The fact that 
4 they used that tool, maybe, again, we don't know that they 
5 even listened to the call, the fact that they may have used 
6 that tool should not taint--would not taint the verdict. What· 
7 it does do, your Honor, is it--it shows a repeated pattern on 
8 the part of defense counsel to suggest prosecutorial 
9 misconduct. Now, I'm not asking for a Rule 11 sanction today 
10 but the first day of trial, he accuses of--of pursuing a win 
11 at all cost strategy. The second day of trial when his 
12 witnesses are late, he says that I tampered with the 
13 witnesses, even though he sent a subpoena telling the to go to 
14 the second floor. And then 47 days after the verdict comes in 
15 he says, oh, well, the laptop went back. And same surprise, 
16 when we discussed this explicitly that I was leaving the 
17 laptop in the courtroom before we went out, he did not raise 
18 an objection before the Court at the time the verdict came in, 
19 he waits 47 days. 
20 And there is appellate case law that suggests 
21 there's a certain time restraint so that the Court can 
22 promptly address any improprieties. This laptop was not 
23 
24 
improper, it was a tool--the whole purpose of that laptop is 
to present information. It's not any prosecutor's laptop 
25 specifically, it's--it's a State laptop. And just like the 
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State's tripod doesn't taint a verdict or the State lights 
don't taint a verdict, the State laptop should not either. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Philpot, would you like to respond to that? 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes, your Honor. I noticed that the 
State offers no explanation as to whether or not there was 
present any effort to introduce evidence about recklessness 
18 
or 
8 knowledge, let alone intent, which they clearly deny in their 
9 opposition. 
10 Loffel still makes clear that there is a default 
11 standard for the statute and whether or not the State did in 
12 fact, agree with that or not, it's there, Loffel makes that 
13 
14 
clear, that the default is intent. 
There's also a presumption of reasonableness for the 
15 defendant in defense of habitation. And if they did not 
16 present evidence on his intent, how can they overcome a 
17 presumption? Again, I--I've said this before and I'll not 
18 belabor that point. It--it evades reason that the jury is 
19 able to find intent when there's an admission that there was 
20 no evidence presented. 
21 The laptop, I don't think we can possibly compare 
22 lights or tripods to laptops. Laptops are capable of allowing 
23 the prosecution, if they wanted to--I'm not saying they did--
24 to listen in on the proceedings. They would allow a juror to 
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1 magazine, they could read a number of magazines, only 
2 restrained in that number by the time that they have in the 
3 jury room. If a magazine can taint a jury, how can a laptop, 
4 wi-fi capable, owned by the prosecution not taint the jury. 
5 As to what they did with it, we have--
6 THE COURT: Do you know the--do you know the 
7 laptop's wi-fi capable? 
8 MR. CARLSON: I'm not a hundred percent sure it is, 





THE COURT: Do you know that it is? 
MR. PHILPOT: I have no idea. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PHILPOT: But it still taints the perception of 
14 the public that they are beyond reproach, more so than a 
15 magazine possibly could. 
16 Again, I would say if it's okay to send the 
17 prosecution's laptop back, then I will bring mine, ready to go 
18 to every trial I ever come to and that's just unreasonable on 
19 
20 
its face, as is sending the prosecution's laptop. 
Now, the prosecution tries to say that we believe 
21 there is prosecutorial misconduct, which we did not say. We 
22 simply claimed that there could be a problem; however, if we 
23 did say there was prosecutorial misconduct, we wouldn't be in 
24 error in the fact--because due to the fact that there is facts 
25 that exist which call into question whether or not it should 
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1 have gone. The fact that it went back is enough for us to say 
2 that shouldn't have gone back. 
3 THE COURT: What should have happened for those 
4 folks to listen to that 9-1-1 call? 
5 MR. PHILPOT: The--with all due respect, your Honor, 
6 the Court needed to be prepared to allow them to listen to 




THE COURT: I'm not asking that question. I'm 























-in your opinion? 
Some sort of CD player in the back, 
Okay. 
All right. 
All right. Thank you. 18 
19 For the reasons stated, I'm going to deny the--for 
20 the reasons stated by Mr. Carlson, I'm going to deny the 
21 motion of the--of the defense. I believe the intent, the 
in 
22 proper mens rea was demonstrated. I believe the self-defense 
23 claim was negated based purely on--on credibility of the 
24 witnesses, when nine said one thing and the defendant's story 










And last of all, the--the laptop was controlled, it 
was only for the playing of the 9-1-1 call and I don't see 
that it caused any taint at all. 
4 So based upon that then, let's move to sentencing. 
5 You can bring your client up. 









report with your client? 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are there any factual 
inadequacies that need to be addressed? 
MR. PHILPOT: I--I do not believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. If that's the case, go ahead 
and proceed. 
MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, we would ask primarily 






THE COURT: Did you say for prison time? 
MR. PHILPOT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I don't think there was any 
20 recommendation here for prison. 
21 MR. PHILPOT: I'm sorry. I thought there was a 




THE COURT: Oh, that's jail. 
MR. PHILPOT: Jail, excuse me. Jail time, your 
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Oh, that's okay. 
I apologize. 
That's all right. 
We would ask that you commute jail 
good job, he has a home, he has animals 
6 which are dependent upon him. This case is old, he has 
7 represented no threat in that neighborhood, he's got neighbors 
8 who has reported that he is a productive and kind and helpful 
9 neighbor. He's pre--he's presented no threat to the victims 
10 in this case. 
11 And to put him in jail, your Honor, would not allow-
12 -would sever his ability to have a job, it would take away his 




14 just does not serve the public nor the interests of justice to 1; 




THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Anything, Mr Carlson? 
MR. CARLSON: Yes, your Honor. There's four points 
19 that I'd ask the Court to consider. 
20 
21 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CARLSON: First, the defendant refuses to take 
22 any accountability for his actions whatsoever. He claims his 
23 civil rights were violated on Page 3, when he talks about how 
24 he may appeal the case. He continues to brush off his own 
25 statements and the statements of his supporting friends, that 
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